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When class actions settle, class attorneys often receive hefty fees, while 
class members only receive illusory benefits.1 Coupled with the fact that 
nearly all class actions settle and that the number of class actions that are 
adjudicated is virtually zero,2 this creates a serious problem. The class 
action system ends up harming individual class members, who are bound 
by the terms of suboptimal settlements. Class actions benefit class 
attorneys and defendants at the expense of individual class members—
precisely those individuals that the class action mechanism was put in 
place to empower. More than corrective justice for class members is 
sacrificed. If class settlements are systematically under-compensatory, 
deterrence of wrongdoers is also compromised. 
The problem is not surprising. Class members are rationally apathetic, 
due to each member’s small individual claim. The same rational apathy 
that brings about the need for class actions in the first place renders class 
supervision of settlement terms ineffective.3 As a result, class counsel 
may be induced by the defendant to knowingly agree to a deal that is 
suboptimal from the class’ perspective in return for increased fees for 
counsel. Class counsel may also unintentionally negotiate a deal that is 
 
† Assistant Professor, Hebrew University Faculty of Law (SJD, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law). I 
am greatly indebted to Ehud Guttel, Adi Leibovitch, Gideon Prachomovsky and Eyal Zamir, as well as 
participants of the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Seminar for helpful discussions, suggestions, and 
comments on earlier drafts. The generous financial support by the Israel Science Foundation is also greatly 
appreciated. Inbar Assaraf and Tal Mendelson provided invaluable research assistance. All errors remain 
my own. 
 1. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION – OUR BROKEN CLASS 
ACTION SYSTEM AND HOW TO FIX IT 4-5 (Oct. 2017), available at 
http://instituteforlegalreform.org/uploads/sites/1/UnstableFoundation_Web_10242017.pdf ; Howard M. 
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (2014); CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 7(Mar. 2015), available at 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf; EMERY 
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 
ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO'S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF 
DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS (2008); Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear L.L.C., 662 F.3d 
913 (7th. Cir. 2011).  
 2. Erichson, supra note 1, at 952; CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 1, at 
48-54; LEE & WILLGING, supra note 1, at 11; Creative Montessori Learning, 662 F.3d at 915. 
 3. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883-89 (1987) (identifying additional issues 
that exacerbate the problem). 
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suboptimal from the class’s perspective.4 Both are manifestations of the 
same agency problem. Class counsel acts as an agent but is not 
accountable to the principals.5 
As the basic problem is long-recognized, several mechanisms have 
been put in place that are geared toward alleviating it. In lieu of effective 
supervision by class members, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires court approval for class settlements. Rule 23 stipulates 
that a court will approve a settlement only if it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate, after considering whether the class was adequately represented, 
the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length, and the relief provided for 
the class is adequate.6 The Rule also sets the procedure for such approval.7 
However, court supervision is notoriously ineffective when class 
actions settle.8 The key reason for this has to do with courts’ institutional 
capacity and with the parties’ incentives. When class actions are 
adjudicated, the parties before the court are adversaries. Class counsel's 
incentives are diametrically opposed to defendant's incentives. Class 
counsel wants the court to award the highest possible amount to the class.9 
Defendants naturally try to persuade the court to award the lowest 
possible amount. By contrast, when class actions settle, both parties 
before the court—class counsel and the defendant—seek approval of the 
settlement. Consequently, the court finds itself in a peculiar position. It 
must act as an adversary to the parties before it and as a fiduciary for 
 
 4. Creative Montessori, 662 F.3d at 918; Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 227, 234 (2014); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action 
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 30 (2004). 
 5. Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking 
Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 439, 441 (1996) (focusing on class members’ whose interests do not 
coincide with those of class representative); Coffee, supra note 3; Paul Harzen Beach, The Parens Patriae 
Settlement Auction, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 455, 466-72 (2016)(focusing on the specific context of Parens 
Patriae settlements. The analysis is equally applicable to class actions). 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(a) – (c); Quimby v. United States., 107 Fed. Cl. 126 (Fed. Cl., 2012); 
In re Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Products Liability Litigation, 716 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Company, No. 16-cv-05479-JST,  2018 WL 6619983 ( N.D. Ca. Dec. 17, 2018). 
 7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1), (3), (4), (5). 
 8. Beach, supra note 5, at 466; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010). 
 9. If only because the class's recovery is a key determinant of class counsel’s fees. Although the 
court does not necessarily award class counsel a percentage of the class's recovery. See infra notes 94 – 
100 and accompanying text. 
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absent class members.10 This is a task courts are ill-equipped to perform.11 
Courts in an adversarial system are dependent on parties’ rivalry. The 
adversarial system is based on the notion that each of the parties will 
collect and present the best evidence and arguments to support its position 
in an attempt to further its own interests. The court is then vested with the 
task of deciding between what are presumably the best cases for each of 
the competing positions.12 When cooperation substitutes rivalry, courts 
are at an inherent disadvantage vis-à-vis the settling parties. As Professor 
Coffee puts it: “the trial court's approval is a weak reed on which to rely 
once the adversaries have linked arms and approached the court in a solid 
phalanx seeking its approval."13 
In addition to their institutional inadequacy, courts also have little 
incentive to challenge settlements. Courts are overloaded with cases. 
Settlements resolve cases at a relatively low cost to the judiciary and clear 
up the docket quickly, and are therefore greatly favored.14 Challenging a 
settlement to which the parties have agreed is, from the court’s 
perspective, counterproductive, even if the settlement is socially 
suboptimal.15 
 
 10. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class 
Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1993); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: 
Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1060-62 (2004). For a brief account of the effect of the various fee (and cost) 
mechanisms on plaintiffs’ attorneys see also Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address: The American Class 
Action: From Birth to Maturity 15 (Jan. 4 2017); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 8, at 249. 
 11. Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear L.L.C., 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th. Cir. 2011); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorney’s Fees In Class Actions: 2009 – 2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937(2017). 
 12. See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. 
Inquisitorial Regimes, 70 ECON. LETTERS 267 (2001)); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In The Best 
Interests of Children – A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System 42(2) FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203 
(2004). For a critique of the distinction (although not of the idea that courts may be dependent on the 
parties’ submissions) see Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 
41 EMORY L.J. 467, 469 (1992). Although the arguments focus on the criminal setting, the observations 
with respect to adversarial versus inquisitor systems are equally valid in the civil setting.  
 13. Creative Montessori, 662 F.3d at 917-18; John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The 
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26-27 (1985). In re Dry 
Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir., 2013). 
 14. See infra notes 86 – 88. 
 15. In this context, the history of patent litigation is instructive. Much like class settlements, 
settlements in patent litigation allow the settling parties to negotiate a mutually beneficial deal at the 
general public’s expense. Specifically, a generic pharmaceutical company challenging a weak patent may 
agree to drop the challenge, thereby extending the brand company’s monopoly, in return for a share of the 
rents accruing to the brand company (on the legal framework that enables such deals in the pharmaceutical 
industry see C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77(3) ANTITRUST L.J. 947 (2011)). And indeed, although the potential for abuse has 
long been recognized in the context of patent litigation, courts have often sanctioned settlements that 
clearly harm the public simply because the parties before the court agreed to the settlement (see FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013)). For an analysis and an overview of court rulings pre- and post- Actavis 
see Michael A. Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 615 
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As an alternative to a review of the terms of the settlement themselves, 
the court may attempt to ensure the adequacy of settlements through class 
counsel's fees. Specifically, the court may award class counsel fees that 
are a percentage of the class's recovery, thereby incentivizing class 
counsel to achieve the best possible outcome for the class. However, the 
percentage-of-recovery fee method is also ineffective. Several issues with 
the award of a percentage-of-recovery fee are discussed subsequently.16 
In the current context, we may focus on the two most important issues. 
First, the percentage-of-recovery does not in any way safeguard against 
class counsel’s genuine miscalculations. Setting fees as a percentage of 
the class’s recovery incentivizes class counsel to do the best job it can. 
But it does not correct class counsel’s errors. Second, even under a 
percentage-of-recovery fee regime, court discretion is unavoidable. A 
fixed, one-size-fits-all percentage is inadequate. The precise percentage 
must be calibrated to compensate counsel for case-specific effort, risk, 
resources, labor, etc. Otherwise, riskier class actions (from the class’s 
perspective), as well as class actions that require more labor than average, 
will not be filed. Therefore, some degree of court discretion must be 
maintained, which reintroduces the court’s institutional inadequacy (and 
disincentive) to act as the parties’ adversary. The parties may present the 
case as more complex than it is, argue that an irregular amount of labor 
was required, and so on. Finally, as the examples at the beginning of this 
Article illustrate, a settlement may seem to award class members a 
different amount than it actually does. This Article provides several 
additional examples of gross misrepresentations of the class’s recovery.17 
In addition to the two court supervision mechanisms—review of the 
settlement terms and judicial control of class counsel’s fees—there are 
two additional mechanisms that rely on class members and may 
theoretically alleviate the agency problem in the context of class 
settlements. First, class members may file objections to settlements.18 
Second, class members may opt out of the class if they find the settlement 
to be unfair.19 These mechanisms also fail to adequately protect class 
members against abuses of class settlements. In a nutshell, both 
mechanisms rely on class members taking action. Therefore, they are 
subject to the same issue that brings about the settlement-inadequacy 
problem in the first place–class members’ rational apathy. They also 
suffer from additional shortcomings that this Article surveys at greater 
 
(2020)). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 92 – 111. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 25 – 32. 
 18. See infra note 112. 
 19. See infra note 124. 
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length.20 
Ultimately, the existing mechanisms fail miserably. It has been argued 
that “most class actions lead to no recovery for absent class members, at 
all, and those that do quite often provide only minimal benefits”.21 Studies 
have found that gains reaped by plaintiffs’ lawyers are grossly 
disproportionate to the supposed benefits of attorney-driven class 
actions,22 and that “too many cases are settled with illusory benefits to 
class members and large fees for lawyers”.23 There is an abundance of 
examples where “class members received nearly worthless coupons and 
class counsel walked away with large fees”.24 Some settlements 
nominally award class members a large amount, but effectively make 
individual compensation not worth the trouble of collecting it.25 For 
example, in a nationwide Sears class action settlement, class members 
were compensated in the form of coupons. Plaintiffs’ attorney received 
approximately $1 million, while the 1.5 million class members redeemed 
a total of $2,402.26 In an alleged price-fixing cartel in the airline industry, 
customers received coupons that could be redeemed for future flights. The 
coupons were severely restricted, could not be combined with other 
 
 20. In fact, they introduce a host of additional complications, such as strategic objections designed 
to extract a share of class counsel’s payment. See infra text accompanying notes 118 – 123. 
 21. Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard on behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce & 
Institute for Legal Reform to Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau 4 (Aug. 22, 2016), available at 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2016_8_22_Chamber_Arbitration_Comment_L
etter.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Hirschmann and Rickard]; Erichson, supra note 1, at 952; Robert H. 
Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 HARV. BUS. REV. 67, 70, 77 
(2007).  
 22. Letter from Hirschmann & Rickard, id., at 3. See also, in the specific context of The Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (“PSLRA”), Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: 
Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 534-37 (1997). CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, supra note 1, at Section 6, 37. > (“CFPB Study”); Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? 
An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions, MAYER BROWN (Dec. 11, 2013), at: 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitC
lassMembers.pdf (“Chamber Study”); Jason Scott Johnston, High Cost, Little Compensation, No Harm 
to Deter: New Evidence on Class Actions Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes, U. VA. L. & 
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 2016-12 (May 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2777618. 
See Andrew Pincus, Assessing ‘The Value of Class Actions,’ LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/ articles/956215/assessing-the-value-ofclass-actions-. 
 23. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at 2. 
 24. Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 236. See also Eversheds Sutherland, LLP, A Study Abroad: Will 
Europe Adopt the US Class Action Mechanism?, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7d6ceae7-700a-4984-90ec-4d94ecfd5edd. Deborah L. 
Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution , 
54 DUKE L.J. 447, 465 n.136 (2004). 
 25. Rhode, id., at 465. Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s 
Clothes Of Class Actions, TRUTH IN ADVERTISING 1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Exhibit-C.pdf. 
 26. Ted Frank, Moody v Sears: Lawyers, $1M. Class, $2,402, OVERLAWYERED (May 5, 
2007), http://www.overlawyered.com/2007/05/moody_v_sears_lawyers_1m_class.html.  
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discounts, were only good for up to 10% off a flight and were subject to 
black-out dates.27 Class attorneys collected more than $50 million in fees, 
in what critics argued was in fact “‘a promotional scheme to induce 
travelers to fly’ during off-peak travel periods”.28 A class action against 
Blockbuster Video settled in a cumbersome coupon arrangement, 
according to which clients would have to visit the store at least twice29 for 
the benefit of a $1 discount off a rental.30 Class attorneys received $9.25 
million in fees.31 The problem is omnipresent in cash settlements as 
well.32 
This Article suggests a simple market-based mechanism that 
guarantees the adequacy of class settlements: an ex post auction of 
appointment as class counsel. Once a settlement has been reached, the 
right to step in as class counsel is auctioned. The minimum bid is the 
amount the defendant agreed to pay class counsel in accordance with the 
settlement agreement. The highest bidder pays original class counsel the 
amount bid and is then appointed as class counsel. Newly-appointed class 
counsel may then pursue the case as she deems fit. She may renegotiate a 
settlement with the defendant, adjudicate the case, or combine the two by 
continuing to litigate the case and settling with the defendant at a later 
stage. There is only one limitation on the fees new class counsel may be 
paid in any future settlement or ruling: the ratio between class recovery 
and class counsel’s fees remains as it was in the original settlement. The 
only way for new class counsel to receive more than she paid original 
class counsel is to increase class members’ recovery. 
The mechanism developed here spontaneously assures the 
appropriateness of the settlement. Both instances of a sellout by class 
counsel and instances of genuine under-estimation of the value of the 
class’s claim will be corrected by the market. This result will be shown in 
greater detail in subsequent sections. But a simple numeric example is 
 
 27. Hantler & Norton, supra note 25, at 1 – 2. 
 28. Id. at 2 (citing David Johnson, Settlement of Airline Suit Draws Critics; Coupons May Bring 
Carriers More Business, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1993, at 1 (Business). See also In re GMC Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 29. Class members could only collect and file a claim form at a Blockbuster outlet. After the claim 
had been processed, the customer was required to visit the store again to rent the video at a discount. 
 30. Johnson v. Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App. 2003). Compensation would not, in any case, 
exceed $18 per client. 
 31. Some commentators labeled the Blockbuster settlement ‘Exhibit A’ in the case against class 
actions, that had been attacked as “shakedowns that mainly enrich the lawyers who bring them.” See, e.g., 
Dan Ackman, Top Of The News: Bogus Blockbuster Settlement, FORBES (June 6, 2001), 
https://www.forbes.com/2001/06/06/0606topblock.html#36aa181bcea6. See also Hantler & Norton, 
supra note 25, at 3; Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom?, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 29, 2004), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2004-02-29-0402290522-story.html (offering the 
Cheerios case as another illustrative example)). 
 32. See also Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013). 
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helpful at this stage. Let us suppose that class counsel and a defendant 
reach a settlement whereby class members receive $100, and class 
counsel is paid $10 in fees. If the settlement is the best attainable 
settlement from the class’s perspective,33 no one will find it worthwhile 
to purchase the right to step in as class counsel. The prospects of 
recovering more than $100 for the class are not promising. Consequently, 
receiving more than $10 in fees is unlikely. Any attorney who purchased 
the right to act as class counsel would be paying original class counsel 
$10 to receive an asset (appointment as class counsel) that is worth no 
more than $10. However, if the settlement is suboptimal for whatever 
reason, acting as class counsel becomes a lucrative investment. Fees are 
fixed at 10% of class recovery, and the true value of the class’s claim is 
higher than $100. The more gross the inadequacy of the settlement, the 
more lucrative it becomes to be appointed as class counsel. If, for 
example, the case can be settled for $500, the right to act as class counsel 
is worth $50. Whether class counsel mistakenly negotiated a deal it 
genuinely thought was beneficial to class members, missed some piece of 
important evidence, or knowingly agreed to a bad deal in return for an 
increase in fees, acting as class counsel presents a lucrative investment 
opportunity for any attorney that identifies this inadequacy. 
Importantly, the mechanism obviates the need for court overview of 
settlements. The court need not review the adequacy of the settlement, its 
reasonableness, or its fairness. The court need not even bother itself with 
the appropriateness of class counsel’s fees as agreed within the 
framework of the settlement. There is no need for any court involvement 
at all, and public expenditure is completely curbed. 
The method developed in this Article economizes on public 
expenditure and court resources (that are, as explained, ineffective in the 
current setting). At the same time, it also guarantees that terms of class 
settlements will be closely monitored by a large number of law firms 
competing amongst themselves to identify inadequate class settlements. 
Because potential class counsel is only required to pay a fraction of the 
value of the total payment to the class,34 any law firm capable of handling 
 
 33. The best attainable settlement is one in which class members receive the largest possible 
amount given the expected value of their claim, taking into account all relevant information, a fair 
assessment of the defendant's chances of success, the time it would take to try the case, the defendant’s 
sensitivity to the reputational cost of litigation and an adverse ruling, and any other factor. 
 34. Attorney’s fees are a fraction of the class’s recovery, which implies that there will be a larger 
supply of competitors if they are required to pay attorney’s fees rather than the full amount of the class’s 
recovery. The ratio of attorney’s fees to total recovery is, of course, important. This point is elaborated on 
subsequently, largely following Eisenberg et al., supra note 11. Generally, attorney’s fees are 
approximately 25% of the class’s recovery. But there is also a scaling effect. The larger the case, the 
smaller the percentage of attorney’s fees. For current purposes, the general point is important – attorney’s 
fees are smaller than the class’s recovery by orders of magnitude. 
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the case on behalf of the class can participate in the auction. The number 
of economic agents reviewing the adequacy of settlements is thus 
multiplied by thousands. Rather than ineffective supervision by the court, 
a single disincentivized agent, at the public’s expense, numerous law 
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar can be expected to closely follow the terms of 
class settlements. 
If a second settlement is reached by new class counsel, the process is 
repeated. The process repeats until a settlement is reached after which no 
one is willing to bid for appointment as class counsel. This provides 
comfort that the final settlement will be the best attainable one. Given that 
law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar compete between them in the first auction, 
one can expect there to typically be only one round of bidding. The price 
paid for appointment as class counsel in the first round should reflect the 
best attainable settlement. In the numeric example presented above, in 
which the value of the class’s claim is $500, the price paid for 
appointment as class counsel in the first auction should be $50 (or 
marginally less). Second class counsel can then be expected to negotiate 
a $500 settlement (otherwise she will not have profited at all), and no one 
should be willing to bid in the second auction. But if, for whatever reason, 
neither first class counsel nor second class counsel have negotiated the 
best attainable settlement for the class, subsequent auctions should rectify 
this. Regardless of how many settlements have been negotiated, if 
additional sums can be extracted from the defendant, someone should be 
willing to bid for appointment as class counsel. Once again, the court 
never needs to review the terms of any of the settlements. It simply 
auctions appointment as class counsel until there are no bids, and 
rubberstamps the last settlement reached. 
By solving the problem of inappropriate settlements, the mechanism 
developed in this Article also indirectly solves another extremely 
perplexing problem of class actions–the so called ‘reverse auction’ that 
plagues the initial appointment of class counsel. Often enough, 
specifically when a class action is filed in the wake of a scandal that has 
received significant media coverage, various firms of the plaintiffs’ bar 
compete amongst themselves for appointment as class counsel. One way 
in which a law firm may secure such appointment is by reaching a 
settlement with the defendant. Once such a settlement is reached and 
sanctioned by the court, all other law firms are preempted from 
adjudicating the case. This competition amongst law firms of the 
plaintiffs’ bar allows the defendant to negotiate a settlement with those 
class attorneys that are willing to settle for the smallest amount, thereby 
precluding all other claims.35 A race to the bottom ensues. The different 
 
 35. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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firms seeking appointment as class counsel, each afraid to be underbid by 
others and receive nothing for their efforts, compete by offering the 
defendant a low-ball settlement. Courts are forced to devote significant 
resources to address this concern.36 This problem too is solved through 
the use of the method developed in this Article. The terms of the first 
settlement and the initial race to the bottom become moot. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part I elaborates 
on class action settlements and on the inadequacy of existing monitoring 
mechanisms. Part II elaborates on the mechanism developed in this 
Article and explains how it overcomes the problems associated with 
monitoring class action settlements. Part III discusses a theoretical 
alternative to the mechanism proposed in this Article and explains why 
the method proposed in this Article is superior to the alternative. Part IV 
concludes. 
I. MONITORING CLASS SETTLEMENTS: THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING 
MECHANISMS 
Class actions provide a legal tool for redressing small-individual, but 
large-overall harm.37 In such settings, each class member’s expected 
private recovery is typically far less than the expected costs of litigation.38 
Therefore, no individual class member will find it worthwhile to incur the 
expenses of litigation.39 It is also impractical for class members to actively 
join forces with each other so that the costs of litigation may be shared. 
Coordination among an extremely large and regularly dispersed group of 
individuals is difficult and costly, and very often impossible.40 The 
transaction costs of such coordination and the possibility of (rational) 
strategic free riding on the part of some class members leave little hope 
of joint action being taken.41 Consequently, wrongdoers who inflict harm 
on a dispersed group might go undeterred, and class members might go 
uncompensated. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class 
 
 36. For a survey of this issue (and a suggested solution to the problem of initial appointment of 
class counsel) see Alon Klement & Moran Ofir, Auctioning Class Action Representation (Apr. 15, 2019), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3329380. 
 37. James N. Phillips, Class Actions, 3 J. CORP. L. 649 (1978). 
 38. James E. Lyons, Class Actions, 1974 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349 (1975); Tom Ford, Rule 23: A 
Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 501 (1969). 
 39. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class 
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 76-77 (2007). 
 40. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 848 (2002); Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 230-31; Bone, supra note 32, at 1103. 
 41. For an analysis of the transaction costs of taking joint action (for example by retaining a single 
firm) and the resulting under deterrence problem see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and 
"Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1387-88 
(2000). 
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actions are designed to address these issues. They lay the legal foundation 
for representation of the class by attorneys who have not been appointed 
by class members.42 They also incentivize these attorneys to act on behalf 
of the class by allowing them to collect fees without negotiating these fees 
with their “clients”—class members.43 
A. The Basic Problem 
The rational apathy of class members and the formidable transaction 
costs of taking joint action, which bring about the need for this mechanism 
in the first place, plague the relationship between class members and class 
counsel as well.44 Class counsel’s identity, fees, and performance are of 
very little importance to individual class members. Class members’ 
incentives to get involved in any of these is even smaller than their interest 
in the action itself.45 Consequently, there is a real risk that attorneys may 
seek to be appointed as class counsel even though they are unfit to serve 
as class counsel, whether due to incompetence, lack of resources to 
litigate a complicated case, or any other reason.46 Once class counsel has 
been appointed, she has both the incentive and ample opportunity to act 
 
 42. Formally, two economic agents, neither of whom has been appointed by class members, act on 
behalf of the class – class counsel and class plaintiff (or ‘named plaintiff’). The latter is a class member 
who also acts on behalf of the class. However, class plaintiffs may be disregarded for current purposes. 
To begin with, class actions are normally driven by attorneys, with class plaintiffs as mere eponyms, 
whose name only “graces the marquee.” Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Actions, 31 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 633, 634 (2003); see also Noel Hensley, Notes: Law Partner of Class Plaintiff Barred from 
Serving as Class Counsel: Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 31 SMU L. REV. 601 (1977); Leslie, supra 
note 39, at 81; Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2 (“For over fifty years, class actions in the US have 
been initiated and litigated by self-driven entrepreneurial lawyers.”). Closely related, class plaintiffs’ 
service awards are normally insignificant amounts, in the tune of several thousands of dollars. Finally, 
and most importantly, even if class plaintiffs are actively involved and control the class action in any 
meaningful way, the analysis of class counsels’ incentives is equally applicable to class representatives’ 
service awards. On the possible convergence of the two see Neil L. Rock, Note, Class Action Counsel as 
Named Plaintiff: Double Trouble, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1987). See also Bone, supra note 32, at 
1103. 
 43. Leslie, supra note 39, at 76 (citing Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
952 (E.D. Tex. 2000)). See also Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 234. 
 44. Leslie, supra note 39, at 76 – 77; Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2. 
 45. Theoretically, each of these factors—the identity of class counsel, class counsel’s fees, and 
class counsel’s performance—may be determinative of the full amount of recovery, making class 
members’ interest in the relevant factor equal to their interest in the class action itself. For example, if 
class counsel is entirely incompetent or sets her fees at 100% of recovery, this impacts the full amount of 
the recovery. But this will be the extreme case. In all other cases, each of these factors only affects a 
portion of the recovery – the portion lost because of counsel’s inability relative to alternative counsel, or 
the excessive share of the defendant’s payment charged by counsel as fees. Therefore, class members’ 
interest in each of these factors is no greater than their interest in the action itself, and in most cases will 
be much smaller. 
 46. Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 
22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 71 (2004). 
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in her own self-interest. The principles, class members, are unlikely to 
effectively monitor the agent’s performance.47 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to address these 
problems with a host of mechanisms for the appointment of class counsel, 
for monitoring class counsel’s performance, and for awarding class 
counsel fees.48 Common to these rules is the substitution of the court’s 
discretion for the contractual relationship that would be expected had 
class members been regular clients. Rather than contracting with class 
members, class counsel seeks court approval on a variety of issues. 
Class settlements present a unique setting in which class members’ 
absence is most problematic.49 Class settlements are unique, because class 
counsel and the defendant have a joint interest that is directly opposed to 
that of class members. This is true specifically with respect to two 
elements of the settlement: class members’ compensation, and class 
definition. With respect to the settlement amount, both settling parties 
have a joint incentive to increase class counsel’s fees at the expense of 
class members’ compensation. With respect to class definition—deciding 
on whom the settlement will be binding—both parties have an incentive 
to define the class broadly. To explain this, it is helpful to first briefly 
review the concept of class certification. 
Class certification is the process of allowing class counsel to act on 
behalf of class members and defining the class on behalf of which the case 
will be handled. In class settlements, the defendants pay class members 
in return for a release.50 Naturally, defendants seek release from all class 
 
 47. In some circumstances, most importantly in securities cases, there may be an individual class 
member whose stake in the case is large enough to justify involvement in the case. For example, the class 
member who owned or purchased the largest number of shares in a public offering. Such a class member 
may engage with counsel. The PSLRA, supra note 22, establishes a refutable presumption according to 
which the person or persons with the largest financial interest in the case is the most adequate lead plaintiff. 
See also Fisch, supra note 22. 
 48. For example, courts appoint class counsel, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), and courts may demand a 
litigation plan as well as any other pertinent information, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(c). See Parkinson v. 
Hyundai Motor America, Nos. CV06-345AHS (MLGX), CV06-3161AHS(MLGX, 2006 WL 2289801, at  
*2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2006); Hill v. The Tribune Co., Nos. 05 C 2602, 05 C 2640, 05 C 2684, O5 C 2927, 
05 C 3374, 05 C 3377, 05 C 3390, 05 C 3928, 2005 WL 3299144, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2005). In re 
Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 56, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Durso v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-5352 (DMC)(JAD), 2:12-cv-5412 (DMC)(JAD), 2:12-cv-5440 (DMC)(JAD), 
2013 WL 4084640 (Aug. 7, 2013). Courts may issue appropriate orders as the case is adjudicated. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. 
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981); Reid v. Unilever U.S., 
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 893, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Naturally, the litigation plan courts may demand when 
appointing class counsel also allows them to monitor performance in the course of adjudication. 
 49. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 50. The legal tool for precluding a plaintiff from relitigating a case is res judicata. An adjudicated 
case is said to create res judicata between the parties to the proceeding, preventing a future court from 
rehearing the case. See generally Robert Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299, 334 (1929). 
For an elaborate account of res judicata in mass litigation (although in the context of parens patria 
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members, or at least from as many class members as possible.51 Class 
members on whom the settlement is not binding may subsequently file 
lawsuits against the settling defendant. In order to sell the release on 
behalf of class members, the class must be certified. That is, class counsel 
must be appointed as the attorney for class members and be allowed to 
act on their behalf.52 Most certified class actions are certified for the 
purpose of settlement.53 A recent survey encompassing 562 class action 
cases found that none of the class actions surveyed ultimately went to 
trial. Certification independent of settlement was found in less than two 
percent of the cases. “Where class certification occurs, it is typically in 
conjunction with class settlement”.54 A similar survey for an earlier period 
reports similar results.55 In practice, therefore, class certification is 
seldom sought as a means of allowing a lawsuit to be filed and adjudicated 
on the class’s behalf. It is obtained almost exclusively as a means of 
sanctioning a settlement negotiated between class counsel and the 
defendant. 
Outside the context of settlements, class counsel and the defendant 
have diametrically opposed interests both with respect to class definition 
and with respect to the amount paid out to each class member. Class 
counsel prefers the largest award to the class, if only because this impacts 
her fees.56 Defendants naturally prefer the lowest possible award. 
Similarly, class counsel benefits from the broadest class definition 
because the larger the class, the greater the overall payout. For the same 
reason, defendants prefer a narrow class definition. But when class 
actions settle, the incentives are reversed. A class settlement naturally 
 
lawsuits) see Gabrielle J. Hanna, The Helicopter State: Misuse Of Parens Patriae Unconstitutionally 
Precludes Individual And Class Claims, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1955, 1957-58 (2017). 
 51. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 3. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, class members are generally afforded an opportunity to opt out of the 
class before approval of a settlement, even if they have already been afforded the opportunity at the 
certification stage (subject to the court’s discretion – see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)). Class settlements 
typically contain a provision addressing the possibility that some class members will opt out of the class. 
Normally, if an agreed percentage of class members opts out of the class, the settlement is altered or 
nullified. See Plaintiff Joy L. Bowens’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Award of 
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and Approval of Class Representative Service Award and Suggestions in 
Support Thereof, Joy L. Bowens v. Mazuma Credit Union, No. 4:15-cv-00758-DW, 2018 WL 8756245 
(W.D. Mo. July 16, 2018); Castillo v. ADT, LLC, Civ. No. 2:15-383 WBS DB, 2017 WL 363109 (E.D. 
Cal. Jan. 24, 2017). 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 53. Erichson, supra note 2, at 952. 
 54. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at 
6.2.2. 
 55. MAYER BROWN, supra note 23, at 1.  (“In our entire data set, not one of the class actions ended 
in a final judgment on the merits for the plaintiffs. And none of the class actions went to trial, either before 
a judge or a jury”). 
 56. See supra note 9. 
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contains two elements that are negotiated in conjunction: compensation 
for the class and class counsel’s fees. Class counsel’s fees normally 
constitute a fraction of the overall payment.57 But, naturally, this is the 
element of the settlement that class counsel is most sensitive to. This is 
what creates the foundation for a sellout deal, where class counsel 
receives an increased payment in return for agreeing to a reduced payment 
to class members or a subset of class members, or for a broader definition 
of the class.  
First, and most intuitively, all class members’ individual compensation 
may be reduced by an amount that is unlikely to be contested and may not 
even be observed. A “discount” of one dollar in the amount payable to 
each class member is likely to go unnoticed, or at least unchallenged. But 
if the class is comprised of a million individuals, this will decrease 
defendant’s total payment by $1 million. The defendant should be willing 
to increase class counsel’s fees by up to that amount. Whether fees are 
collected directly from the defendant under a fee-shifting statute,58 or 
nominally collected from the class’s recovery (which the defendant pays), 
the outcome is no different. The total amount accruing to the class may 
be reduced in return for an increase in class counsel’s fees.59 
A second form of sellout is the sellout of specific subclasses, or an 
overly broad definition of the class.60 For example, in the famous Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor case,61 a class action against asbestos 
manufacturers, the purported settling class included all employees who 
had been exposed to asbestos as well as certain family members of those 
employees.62 Importantly, the class included all employees (and family 
members) who had been exposed to asbestos prior to the date of the 
settlement, whether or not they had already sustained injury or presented 
relevant symptoms (the so-called “exposure-only plaintiffs”). The 
settlement may have been fair to those class members who had already 
exhibited symptoms of one of the relevant diseases. But it aimed to create 
res judicata against those class members who had not yet exhibited 
 
 57. Erichson, supra note 2; Eisenberg et al., supra note 11. 
 58. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 322-23 (1984); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003); 
See also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 30. 
 59. When the defendant does not directly pay class counsel’s fee, the sellout cannot take the form 
of a side payment, as such side payments must be disclosed (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3)). The deal will 
thus take the form of not contesting a specific fee request, or not challenging certain arguments with 
respect to time invested, tasks undertaken, and the like. See infra text accompanying notes 89 – 102. 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
 61. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 62. The class included people who had been exposed “..either occupationally or through the 
occupational exposure of a spouse or household member, to asbestos or to asbestos-containing products 
for which one or more of the Defendants may bear legal liability..”, as well as "[a]ll spouses, parents, 
children, and other relatives… of [those class members]…” Id. at 603 n.5. 
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symptoms and prevented them from filing a future lawsuit, if and when 
they experienced bodily injury or other harm. The exposure-only subclass 
was not properly compensated for this waiver. Similarly, in a securities 
class action against Verifone Holdings,63 a public company listed both in 
the U.S. and abroad, the settling class included both investors in the U.S. 
and in foreign countries.64 The proposed notice of the settlement would 
have been sufficient for U.S. investors. But it would have likely resulted 
in very few foreign investors realizing that they were entitled to 
compensation, although they were to be bound by the settlement 
agreement.65 
Class counsel and defendants can be expected to choose between 
mistreating the entire class and mistreating a specific subclass or 
subclasses, based on the relative sensitivity of each of the subclasses. If 
there is a specific subclass that is least sensitive to the settlement, that 
subclass will be targeted. If not, all class members’ compensation can be 
reduced by an amount that the parties believe will survive court scrutiny. 
The upshot of this observation is that when a class settlement is 
presented, both the settlement terms themselves and class definition raise 
concern.66 
B. Existing Mechanisms 
Of the various mechanisms that are currently in place for supervising 
class counsel, four may seemingly be harnessed to overcome the agency 
problem in the specific context of class settlements. First, and most 
directly, settlements require court approval. Courts will only approve a 
settlement if it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.67 Second, courts decide 
on class counsel’s fees.68 Structuring fees as a percentage of the class’s 
 
 63. Stipulation of Settlement, In re Verifone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:07-cv-06140-EMC 
(N.D. Ca. Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-
documents/1038/PAY_01/201389_r01s_07CV06140.pdf. 
 64. Id. at 6. 
 65. See CA 22300-05-15 (Central District Court) Moshe Hayit v. Verifone Systems Inc. [published 
on Nevo, May 14th, 2018; in Hebrew). 
 66. While the two issues are intertwined in the context of settlements, they are analytically distinct. 
The two issues have now been clearly severed by the amended Civil Procedure Rules that came into force 
in December 2018. These require the court to consider whether it is likely to both approve the proposal 
and certify the class before notice of the proposed settlement is sent to class members – see FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(e)(1)(b)(i)-(b)(ii). See also BOLCH JUD. INST., DUKE LAW SCHOOL, GUIDELINES AND BEST 
PRACTICES IMPLEMENTING 2018 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 2 
– 3 (Aug. 2018), available at https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Class-Actions-
Best-Practices-Final-Version.pdf (“Guidelines and Best Practices”). 
 67. See supra note 6. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 
2010); Keil v. Lopez, 862 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017); Geneva Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. 
Cl. 581 (Fed. Cl.2015); Saccoccio v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 297 F.R.D. 683 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
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recovery ostensibly overcomes the agency problem. Third, class members 
may voice objections to settlements.69 Finally, class members may opt out 
of such settlements.70 This Section reviews these mechanisms and their 
inadequacies. 
1. Court Supervision 
The first existing mechanism designed to secure the adequacy of class 
settlements is the court's review of the terms of the settlement. Rule 
23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stipulates that:  
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or  a class proposed 
to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily 
dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) orders the court to approve a settlement that 
would bind class members only after finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. In deciding whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate, the court must consider, among other factors, whether the class 
was adequately represented by class representatives and class counsel,71 
whether the proposal was negotiated at arm's length,72 and whether the 
relief to the class is adequate, taking into account the costs, risks, and 
delay of trial and appeal.73 In order to safeguard against side agreements,74 
the parties seeking approval must file statements identifying any 
agreement made in connection with the proposal.75 Any such agreement 
is also to be considered by the court when evaluating the settlement.76 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also address the appropriateness 
of certification and class definition. They allow the court to divide the 
class into subclasses, each of which may then be treated as a class.77 
Despite these formal requirements, court supervision is an ineffective 
measure for securing the adequacy of settlements. The reason, as briefly 
outlined above, is that the only parties before the court—class counsel and 
the defendant—have a joint interest in the approval of the settlement. The 
deal may or may not be fair, reasonable, and adequate. But once class 
 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); (e)(5). 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(b), (e)(4). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(B) 
 73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i). 
 74. BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 66, at 16; Gary E. Mason & Jennifer S. Goldstein, Unveiling 
The New Class Action Rules, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Nov. 2018), available at 
https://archive.justice.org/what-we-do/enhance-practice-law/publications/trial-magazine/unveiling-new-
class-action-rules. 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv). 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
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counsel and the defendant have reached an agreement, they both want it 
to be sanctioned. The hallmark of litigation is "a clash between 
proponents of conflicting views,"78 and the court is deprived of the 
benefits of this clash when a settlement has been reached. 
The most immediate problem arises in assessing the fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms themselves. Courts 
build on the adversarial relationship between parties.79 Litigation is 
normally a zero-sum game, in which any dollar paid to plaintiff comes 
out of defendant’s pockets, and any dollar saved by defendant comes at 
plaintiff’s expense. Each party can, therefore, be expected to do its best 
to improve its position vis-à-vis that of the opposing party. But litigation 
loses this feature if class counsel’s fees can be increased in return for a 
reduction in the total amount paid to the class. The litigation process in 
this setting is, essentially, an ex parte process80 with the illusion of an 
adversarial one. The parties before the court attempt to persuade it that a 
settlement is adequate. Whether or not this is the case, neither party can 
be expected to unearth evidence or conduct in-depth legal research in an 
attempt to challenge its opponent’s contentions. A court cannot be 
expected to effectively supervise the adequacy of a specific outcome if 
neither party before it submits evidence, brings forward witnesses, or 
contests the adequacy of the settlement. 
Court supervision is generally ineffective regardless of class counsel’s 
motives for agreeing to an inappropriate settlement. Let us assume that 
class counsel genuinely believes that a settlement is optimal from the 
class’s perspective (after factoring all relevant factors, i.e. the risks of 
litigation, costs, expected length of litigation, etc.). Let us further assume 
that class counsel is mistaken. Class counsel may have missed a “smoking 
gun”, may have conducted insufficient legal research, may have 
underestimated how sensitive the defendant is to press coverage 
associated with litigation, or otherwise under-evaluated the full amount 
that can be extracted from the defendant. Regardless of the reason, 
defendant will naturally see little reason to point to class counsel’s error, 
and the court will consequently be unlikely to realize that the settlement 
 
 78. Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three 
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966). See also Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England, 1 
WLR 473, 484 (1979) (H.L.) (Eng.); "Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of 
the question" Lord Eldon, Ex parte Lloyd, 70, 72 (1822). 
 79. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 282 (2nd ed., 1887) 
Zweigert, K. & Ktz, H., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW Tr. T. Weir (T. Weir trans., 2d ed. 
1987). 
 80. Parties are notified of the hearing and may participate in it. Formally, the hearing is not an ex 
parte hearing. But the notice is generally ineffective, with the general exception of ‘professional 
objectors’, that do not serve absent class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B); see also infra notes 
118 – 123. 
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is suboptimal. 
Court supervision is also ineffective in monitoring class definition, the 
appropriate division into subclasses, and the inclusion of certain 
subclasses in the class.81 As with the terms of the settlement, the court is 
ineffective regardless of class counsel’s motives for (inappropriately) 
including a subclass in the general class. Class counsel may intentionally 
sell out a specific subclass because that subclass is less sensitive to the 
settlement terms, or because including the specific subclass makes the 
sellout easier to conceal. Class counsel may also unintentionally include 
a subclass in the general class without realizing that the subclass has 
divergent interests. Once again, the defendant has little reason to flag this. 
In general, regarding the effect certification has on the defendant, class 
certification within the framework of settlements is the exact opposite of 
certification for adjudication. When class actions are certified for 
litigation, certification is damaging to defendant’s interests.82 A large 
number of individual lawsuits, which would otherwise never have been 
filed83 (or would have been filed “only [by] a lunatic or fanatic”)84 are 
allowed to be jointly adjudicated by class counsel. And the larger the 
class, the larger the expected payment. By contrast, when a class action is 
settled, certification works to the benefit of the defendant. The larger the 
class, the more potential lawsuits are barred by res judicata and the larger 
the benefits of the settlement.85 
Thus, even if neither class counsel nor the defendant have intentionally 
targeted a specific subclass, the defendant cannot be expected to contest 
a definition of the class that is too broad. Absent any challenge from the 
defendant, the court is deprived of its main source of objections to class 
counsel’s contentions. 
To add to the court’s incapability of reviewing the various elements of 
a settlement, the court also has little incentive to challenge a settlement. 
Courts are overloaded with cases,86 and settlements are the easiest way to 
 
 81. Although it is nominally vested with this responsibility – FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
 82. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995). In 
fact, as the court notes, the very threat of class certification may be abused to “create the opportunity for 
a kind of legalized blackmail.” Id. at 784. 
 83. Hantler & Norton, supra note 25, at 2. 
 84. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 85. Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 5, at 444; Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154 – 55 
(S.D. Ohio 1992). 
 86. Alessandro Martinuzzi, Taking Justice Seriously: The Problem of Courts Overload and the 
New Model of Judicial Process, 8 CIV. PROC. REV. 1, 65-106 (Jan.-Apr. 2017), available at 
www.civilprocedurereview.com. On the overload of class actions see Stephen E. Morrissey,  State 
Settlement Class Actions That Release Exclusive Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for 
Multijurisdictional Management of Shareholder Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1810 (1995). 
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clear the docket.87 Settlements are generally favored,88 and class 
settlements are no exception. 
Ultimately, court supervision is ineffective in monitoring any element 
of class settlements. As Professor Coffee observed almost twenty-five 
years ago: “[C]ourts have little ability or incentive to resist the settlements 
that the parties in class litigation reach . . . the quest for accountability 
must look to other weapons and remedies”.89 
2. Monitoring Settlements Through Class Counsel’s Fees 
Another mechanism that may be used as a check on the appropriateness 
of class settlements is the requirement that the court approve class 
counsel’s fees. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, class counsel’s fees 
must be approved by the court. Parties are obligated to fully disclose any 
agreement and any payment made by the defendant to class counsel,90 as 
well as “undertakings that, although seemingly separate, may have 
influenced the terms of the settlement by trading away possible 
advantages for the class in return for advantages for others”.91 Thus, the 
court can be expected to receive information relevant to identifying the 
ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery. 
Class counsel’s fees can be used to align class counsel’s incentives with 
those of class members. Specifically, class counsel’s fees can be set as a 
percentage of the class’s total recovery. 
The first problem with the use of class counsel’s fees as a control 
mechanism is that this mechanism addresses only one of the two potential 
reasons for the inadequacy of a settlement. Neither the percentage-of-
recovery nor the rule-of-thumb methods are effective when class counsel 
mistakenly agrees to a suboptimal settlement. When the case is one of a 
sellout, class counsel must be “bribed” by the defendant. Some excessive 
payment must be made, resulting in an irregular ratio between class 
counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery. But when the settlement is 
inappropriate because class counsel has underestimated the value of the 
claim itself, the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery 
will not be excessive in any way. Thus, controlling class counsel’s fees 
cannot address inadequate settlements that stem from class counsel’s 
 
 87. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).  
 88. Id.  
 89. John Coffee. Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1343, 1348 (1995). 
 90. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
 91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Committee Notes On Rules – 2003 Amendment (referring to 
subdivision (e)(2)).  
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mistake, incompetence, or negligence.92 This severely limits the efficacy 
of this mechanism. 
The percentage-of-recovery method is ostensibly more effective in 
addressing intentional sellouts. And empirical studies have indeed found 
that “the amount of client recovery is by far the most important 
determinant of the attorney fee amount”,93 and that “the dominance of the 
client’s recovery as a determinant of the fee is nearly complete”.94 
Upon closer examination, however, the percentage-of-recovery 
method is far from a solution to the incentive-alignment problem. First, 
the percentage-of-recovery method results in some misalignment, where 
additional hours of work are justified from the class’s perspective but not 
from the attorney’s perspective.95 Although socially desirable in the sense 
that their marginal utility exceeds their marginal cost, these hours may not 
be invested by the attorney, who does not capture the full marginal utility 
of these additional hours, but bears their full marginal cost. 
Scholars have long observed that the percentage-of-recovery method 
incentivizes counsel to settle too early for too little.96 To address the 
under-investment problem, an alternative method, known as the lodestar 
method,97 may be used. The lodestar method awards class counsel 
reasonable fees for a reasonable amount of work when the class has 
triumphed in litigation. 
As a standalone method, the lodestar method is inadequate because it 
makes counsel indifferent to the class’s recovery and even incentivizes 
class counsel to overinvest and prolong litigation.98 But as a 
 
 92. Coffee, supra note 89, at 1379. 
 93. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 28.  
 94. Id. See also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 8, at 249 – 50; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey 
Miller, The Role of Op-outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1557, 1563 (2004). A newer study by Eisenberg, Miller and Germano focusing 
on 2009 – 2013 finds very similar results. Attorney’s fees were set as a percentage of recovery in 53.61% 
of the cases, and in 38.23% of the cases the percentage-of-recovery method was used in combination with 
the lodestar method. In total, the percentage-of-recovery mechanism was used in nearly 92% of the cases. 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 945. See also Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2. 
 95. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 32. 
 96. Written Submission of Judge Arlin Adams to the Third Circuit Task Force on Appointment of 
Counsel in Class Action Lawsuits 10 (Mar. 14, 2001), available at 
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/adams1.pdf; Coffee, supra note 89, at 1388. 
 97. For a survey of these and earlier methods (specifically the multifactor approach, that considers 
‘all relevant factors’ including the risk, expertise, reputation and experience of the attorneys, awards in 
similar cases, and the like), see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 30 – 32. 
 98. Id. at 31; Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get There from 
Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809 (2000). Although in extreme cases the court will not grant class counsel 
payment for superfluous hours, it is very difficult to decide ex post precisely what amount of time should 
have been spent on a task. Often enough, research that did not yield benefits to the class was reasonable 
ex ante. Ex post review of time spent on a case is extremely difficult, and class counsel will normally be 
able to provide a compelling justification for investing the declared number of hours (or incurring a 
specific expense). In all but the very extreme cases, class counsel can obtain larger rewards by investing 
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complementary measure, it may be helpful. The lodestar method may be 
used in combination with (and sometimes as a substitute for) the 
percentage-of-recovery method to finetune class counsel’s incentives.99 
Awarding class counsel a percentage of the class’s recovery while 
allowing the court to finetune the amount based on a lodestar method 
generally (although imperfectly) aligns class counsel’s incentives with 
those of class members.100 But once the need for finetuning is 
acknowledged, court supervision again becomes indispensable. This 
reintroduces the court’s institutional incompetence to function as an 
adversary to the parties before it. Parties can easily persuade the court to 
sanction a larger payment to class counsel. 
The more important issue with the percentage-of-recovery fee is that 
even if the need to finetune fees through the lodestar method is ignored, 
court supervision remains essential. A fixed, one-size-fits-all percentage 
is insufficient. Some cases are riskier than others. The reward to counsel 
must be sensitive to the risk associated with the investment of work ex 
ante. If successful cases are not rewarded in a manner that compensates 
attorneys for work invested in unsuccessful cases, class actions may never 
be brought.101 Innovative class actions will certainly be under-
incentivized. Additionally, specific cases may require more work than the 
average case. Even if the case is not innovative in the sense that it argues 
for some novel interpretation of the law, the factual inquiry may be very 
costly. Certain cases may require in-depth pre-suit investigations. Class 
counsel may have to unearth evidence, interview corporate officers, or 
solicit whistleblowers that were privy to wrongdoings. In some areas—
most specifically in securities litigation—the modus operandi of the 
plaintiffs’ bar has become to conduct such pre-suit investigations.102 Such 
 
unnecessary time on the case. This is even more problematic in the settlement context, given the lack of 
an adversary who may challenge overbilling.  
 99. Beach, supra note 5, at 491 – 92. Coffee, supra note 3, at 883 – 89. Eisenberg & Miller, supra 
note 4, at 32. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1273, 1291 (2012) (focusing on non-class mass litigation, but identifying the misalignment problem 
in the context of class actions as well); Miller, supra note 42, at 637 (pointing to the inadequacies of each 
method in the context of settlement). 
 100. Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 472 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Supplemental Expert Report, 
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2008 WL 827995 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2008); Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). As mentioned, 
Eisenberg et al. find that between 2009 – 2013 this combination was used in nearly 40% of the cases. 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11. 
 101. In this respect, class actions are similar to investment in research and development, where the 
reward for successful projects (inventions) must compensate for unsuccessful projects. See Ariel Katz, 
Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 
859 (2007). 
 102. For a comprehensive account of the development of these pre-complaint investigations as a 
response to heightened pleading standards (that are a prerequisite for disclosure) laid down by the PSLRA, 
see PSLRA, supra note 22; see also Roy Shapira, Mandatory Arbitration and the Market for Reputation, 
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class actions should be encouraged, or at least should not be discouraged. 
They contribute to deterrence in greyer areas of law and improve 
enforcement when other methods are likely to fail. But a fixed percentage 
will attract only those cases in which the fixed percentage is, ex ante, 
sufficient to justify the investment; that is, those cases in which the legal 
case is straightforward and the facts are easily discovered and proven.103 
A one-size-fits-all percentage is inadequate not only for cases that 
deserve larger compensation, but also—naturally—in the opposite 
setting. At times, it may be justified to award counsel a percentage that is 
smaller than the rule-of-thumb percentage. Specifically, when the 
expected amount of work or level of risk is far smaller than the amount of 
work and level of risk that would, ex ante, require award of the fixed 
percentage, the percentage must be adjusted downward. 
If the rule-of-thumb figure becomes a de facto fixed percentage, a 
“lemon market” will ensue.104 Attorneys will only bring cases in which 
the expected investment or level of risk are smaller than (or equal to) the 
amount of investment and level of risk that are justified (ex ante) by the 
fixed percentage. Over time, the average risk and average amount of work 
will become smaller, and the percentage will need to be adjusted 
downward to reflect the new (smaller) average amount of investment and 
level of risk. This, in turn, will further reduce the level of risk and amount 
of work that are justified ex ante, and so on. 
The percentage-of-recovery awarded in a specific case or in a specific 
kind of cases must thus be calibrated. As the parties have control over 
how the case is presented to the court, they can easily argue that cases 
were (ex ante) more complex than they actually were, thereby increasing 
class counsel’s fees. Ultimately, the percentage-of-recovery method must 
include a significant degree of court discretion. This reintroduces the 
court’s incompetence and lack of incentives to act as an adversary to the 
parties before it.105 
Combining the lodestar method with the percentage-of-fee method 
exacerbates the problem. The lodestar method clearly requires a large 
degree of court discretion in deciding what amount of time was 
reasonable, what hourly-rate is reasonable, etc. 
Both setting the percentage-of-recovery and finetuning it with the 
 
99 B.U. L. REV. 873, 895-96 (2019). For a real-life example see Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs 
Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 103. See Adams, supra note 96, at 10. 
 104. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 105. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 938. Eisenberg et al.’s article is in fact an attempt to offer 
courts some guidance based on a large number of cases. But this will not solve the issue of parties’ ability 
to manipulate where the specific case should fall in the given range that can be gleaned from the larger 
population of cases. 
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lodestar method thus require court discretion. And the parties may lock 
arms with respect to both methods. They can agree on, and argue for, a 
different percentage;106 they may agree that additional fees are required 
to compensate for expenses incurred; the per-hour payment may be 
increased;107 or counsel may be allowed to bill additional hours the 
defendant may otherwise have contested.108 
Finally, it must be noted that real-life sellouts are likely to result in 
relatively minute changes in the percentage-of-recovery argued for by the 
parties. Even very small changes to the percentage, which are likely to be 
nearly impossible to challenge, may well be extremely lucrative from 
class counsel’s perspective. They may thus be sufficient to induce a 
sellout that is extremely harmful to class members. To use realistic 
figures,109 suppose that a class action settles for $50 million. Further, 
suppose that the rule of thumb is that class counsel is awarded twenty 
percent of the amount as fees, or $10 million. Suppose that the case is a 
relatively easy one, and that class counsel’s efforts, as anticipated ex ante, 
justify awarding a fee of fifteen percent of the class’s recovery instead of 
the standard twenty percent. If parties argue for fees in the tune of sixteen 
percent, the inadequacy may be too fine for the court to notice. It is very 
difficult to calibrate a legal rule that is sensitive enough to differentiate 
between fifteen and sixteen percent when both figures are significantly 
less than the standard. The difference is trivial in terms of ex ante risk-
assessment. But it increases class counsel’s fees by $500,000. A sellout 
remains very lucrative, and thus a very troubling possibility.110 The 
general point is that small changes in the percentage-of-recovery that the 
court cannot realistically condemn can result in very troubling sellouts.  
This analysis should not be taken to suggest that court supervision is of 
no value at all. Egregious sellouts may be observable, and the court can 
be expected to disapprove settlements in which the sellout is obvious.111 
At the very least, when it is clear that very little work has been done and 
 
 106. E.g. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 107. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990); Student Pub. Interest Research Grp., 
Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1988); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 493, 498 
(N.J. 1988). See also William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees 
under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L. J. 438, 461-72 (1989). 
 108. Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory Of Attorneys' Fees In Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 656 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 726-27 
(1987). 
 109. Based on Eisenberg et al.’s research, these seem to be reasonable real-life examples. See 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 938. 
 110. If the best attainable settlement exceeds $54.6 million, class counsel will earn more by 
reaching the best attainable settlement for the class. Of course, if this is the case, the settlement figure 
itself can be slightly increased, so that a fee that is somewhere between 19% and 19.75% of the class’s 
recovery will make the sellout profitable.  
 111. E.g. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
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class counsel is paid a fee that is very large in comparison to the class’s 
recovery, the court may notice the inadequacy of the settlement. But even 
in the most extreme settings, detection and condemnation are far from 
certain. Even if the court is confident that, from a legal perspective, the 
case was not a risky one ex ante, it is not at all clear that class counsel has 
not performed in-depth research, unearthed evidence, obtained statements 
from defendant’s corporate officers, or located other “smoking guns.” 
Each of these may be costly and very effective in persuading the 
defendant to settle at an earlier time. Instances of generous fees paid early 
on may be nothing more than a result of demanding work, for which class 
counsel should be adequately compensated. Ultimately, even very 
generous compensation for class counsel at an early stage does not 
necessarily indicate an inadequate settlement. 
Setting class counsel’s fees as a percentage-of-recovery thus fails to 
address the inadequacy of class action settlements. First, it is completely 
ineffective when the reason for the inadequacy is class counsel’s innocent 
mistake and not an intentional sellout. Second, it does not obviate the need 
for court discretion in a setting in which the court lacks the ability (and 
incentive) to effectively monitor the adequacy of the terms of the 
settlement. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the percentage-
of-recovery method is often combined with the lodestar method. Third, 
small changes in the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s 
recovery may greatly enrich class counsel, but may, nonetheless, be 
practically immune from court condemnation. Finally, even in egregious 
sellouts, the percentage-of-recovery method can only serve as a red flag. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the percentage-of-recovery method is a far 
cry from an effective control mechanism. The findings according to which 
class attorneys often receive excessive fees and class members receive 
illusory benefits should come as no surprise. 
3. Class Members’ Objections To Proposed Settlements 
An alternative (or a supplement) to court supervision is class members’ 
supervision. Specifically, when class actions settle, class members are 
notified of the settlement, and are afforded an opportunity to participate 
in a hearing and raise any objection they may have to the settlement.112 
Class members can regularly be assumed to have received appropriate 
notice of the settlement. For reasons that have to do with personal 
 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). See also, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975); 
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973); Edelson PC v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16 C 
11057, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122141 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018); Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 F.3d 980 
(7th Cir.2018). 
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jurisdiction and due process,113 courts are vigilant in ensuring that class 
members receive proper notice of settlements, even when the costs of 
notifying the class are high.114 
Nevertheless, class participation remains an ineffective safeguard 
against inadequate settlements. Notice to class members guarantees only 
that class members know (or can reasonably know) that a settlement has 
been reached. But potential awareness of the fact that a settlement has 
been reached is insufficient. Class members must also realize that the 
terms of the settlement are inadequate and find it worthwhile to act on this 
realization. Neither of these is likely, at least with respect to individual 
class members.115 Realizing that a settlement is inappropriate requires a 
thorough review of the terms of the settlement, a comprehensive legal 
analysis of the merits, and an understanding of the evidentiary basis of the 
action. A class member is unlikely to undertake this effort given class 
members’ trivial individual stakes. 
Second, even if class members realize that the terms of the settlement 
are inadequate, acting on this realization is costly. Taking action requires 
appearing before the court and arguing against the settlement. Class 
members’ private gains from taking such action are insufficient to justify 
the cost. 
In lieu of supervision by individual class members, objectors acting on 
behalf of a large number of class members may seemingly serve as a 
safeguard against inadequate settlements. These objectors may then be 
paid for the value added to the class as a result of their objection. 
However, this possibility also provides little comfort. 
First, the objector must persuade the court of the inadequacy, against 
class counsel’s and defendant’s vigorous objections. Once the parties 
have reached a settlement, they naturally do not want the court to reject 
it. Even if the objection is valid, the cost of overcoming the parties’ 
objections may be significant, and the chances are not necessarily 
promising. Many objections may not be worth the trouble of filing. 
Moreover, the court cannot order the settling parties to agree to an 
alternative settlement. It can only reject their settlement or a certain aspect 
thereof and order the parties to renegotiate. This, in turn, means that there 
is an ever-present risk that the parties will not agree on an alternative 
settlement, which reintroduces the issue of the court’s incentive. The 
 
 113. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). For a comprehensive account (and an 
alternative perspective) see Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to 
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599 (2015); Hanna, supra note 50, at 1958. 
 114. E.g. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993); In re 
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. 2002); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 
288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002); But see Leslie, supra note 39, at 76-77. 
 115. On professional objectors see infra text accompanying notes 118 – 123. 
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court should be reluctant to strike down a settlement and risk having to 
hear the case. Finally, even when the objection is vindicated, the court 
may not view the improvement in the settlement terms as very significant 
or may not view the work associated with the objection as very 
demanding. The fees awarded by the court may therefore not justify the 
objector’s investment. 
Second, the improvement in the settlement brought about by objectors 
can only be minimal. It is impossible for a court to pinpoint a single figure 
that constitutes a fair settlement. The fairness determination requires a 
multi-factor analysis, accounting for legal and non-legal considerations 
such as the defendant’s sensitivity to the reputation associated with 
litigation, the chances of witnesses not appearing at trial, etc. There is thus 
a very broad range of reasonable settlements. Some of the factors 
impacting the analysis are intangible and cannot be assessed by the court. 
Thus, any settlement within the reasonable range, and even some 
settlements falling outside this range, will survive court scrutiny. If the 
objections sway the court, the settling parties can change the terms of the 
settlement to the minimum necessary to pass court scrutiny. Even when 
successful, objections can only provide minimal improvements to 
settlements, bringing the settlement into the tolerable range. Objections 
have no chance of resulting in the best attainable settlement from the 
class’s perspective. Settlements remain suboptimal from the class’s 
perspective. Additionally, even slight inadequacies may be an opportunity 
for a lucrative sellout that imposes a great loss on class members.116 
The inadequacy of the post-objection settlement, a formidable issue in 
its own right, exacerbates the first issue of the objector’s cost-benefit 
analysis. If objectors can only push settlements into the tolerable range, 
the value added to the class is smaller and the objector can only hope to 
receive relatively small fees, derived from the difference between the 
original settlement and the minimally tolerable settlement. This chills the 
incentives to undertake the uphill battle of filing the objection in the first 
place, even disregarding the court’s incentives. 
Therefore, objections are helpful only in very grossly inappropriate 
settlements and can never result in the best possible settlement. 
Objections provide a very limited solution to the inadequacy of 
settlements. 
Not surprisingly, the reality is that objections—or, more accurately, the 
potential for abuse of objections—have become a problem for adequate 
settlements rather than a solution for inadequate ones.117 
 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 109 – 110. 
 117. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006); But see Eric Alan Isaacson, A Real-World Perspective on Withdrawal of Objections 
to Class Action Settlements and Attorney’s Fee Awards: Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to Federal 
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The possibility of filing an objection has also attracted what have come 
to be known as “professional objectors.”118 The practice of professional 
objections entails filing a meritless objection to class settlements on 
behalf of unnamed class members. When the court approves the 
settlement despite the objection, the professional objector appeals the 
ruling.119 The objector does not typically intend to see the appeal 
through.120 The appeal imposes litigation costs as well as the costs of 
delay in execution of the settlement on the settling parties. This allows the 
professional objector to extract a payoff from class counsel and the 
defendant in return for withdrawing the appeal. At times, even an appeal 
is unnecessary. Sometimes, the delay caused by filing an objection with 
the district court is enough to extract a payment.121 Professional objectors 
have been characterized as “pariah[s] to the functionality of class action 
lawsuits”.122 
Rather than solving the problem of settlement inadequacy, the 
possibility of filing an objection has become “what is effectively a tax on 
class action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to 
the objectors.”123 
 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5), 10 ELON L. REV. 35 (2018). As the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
noted: “Although [such] payment may advance class interests in a particular case, allowing payment 
perpetuates a system that can encourage objections advanced for improper purposes.” BOLCH JUD. INST., 
supra note 66, at 20. 
 118. John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do About 
Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 867-70 (2012). For an opposing view see Isaacson, id., at 35. 
 119. The Supreme Court has ruled that such non-named class members are a ‘party’ to the action, 
and therefore have a right to appeal the decision. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). As Lopatka 
and Smith note, the case may have been decided differently had the action not been one brought under 
Rule 23(b)(1) that does not afford class members the opportunity to opt out of the class. Lopatka & Smith, 
id., at 868). 
 120. Lopatka & Smith, id., at 868. 
 121. Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 122. Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Civ. No. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 8, 2000). See also references in Lopatka & Smith, supra note 118, at 866, 869. 
 123. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006). But see Isaacson, supra note 117. The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Procedure that came into force in late 2018 attempt to address these concerns by limiting settling parties’ 
ability to pay off objectors. Such payments must be disclosed, and require court approval. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e)(5)(B). See also BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 66, at 20 – 30. Following these amendments, 
objections are less attractive as a mean to extract payments from the settling parties. 
But this does not rectify the problem. First, the amendments do not address the problems associated with 
filing genuine objections. It is still costly to file genuine objections, and these objections can only drive 
settlements into the tolerable range, not optimize them. The recent amendments may change the ratio of 
good-faith to bad-faith objections changes, but will not rectify the inadequacy of settlements. Perhaps 
even more importantly, the amended rules do not truly eliminate the possibility of payoffs to the objector. 
The requirement for court approval of the terms of any agreement between the settling parties and the 
objector suffers from the same deficiencies that court approval of the original class settlement suffers 
from. Class counsel, the defendant and the objector can easily join forces. Class counsel and the defendant 
may apply minimal changes to the settlement, present the objector’s role in improving the settlement as 
such that justifies a generous reward, and file for approval of the amended settlement with a payment to 
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4. Opt Outs 
The last way to theoretically address the inadequacy of settlements is 
the opt out mechanism. This mechanism is similar to objections in that it 
relies on class members rather than on courts to supervise settlements. 
When class members are notified of the settlement, they may opt out of 
the class whether or not they had a chance to opt out of the class at an 
earlier stage.124 
Opting out of the class indirectly addresses the adequacy of class 
settlements. Opt outs make the settlement less attractive from the 
defendant’s perspective because the class bound by res judicata is 
smaller. If a large enough number of class members opts out of the class, 
class counsel and the defendant may renegotiate a more appropriate 
settlement. Indeed, many class settlements contain a provision making the 
settlement contingent on a certain percentage of class members not opting 
out.125 
However, this mechanism too is ineffective. First, much like filing an 
objection, opting out requires that class members not only know that a 
settlement has been reached, but also incur the costs of reviewing the 
settlement itself and the underlying evidence and legal argumentation in 
order to realize that the settlement is inadequate.126  
Second, although it is relatively easy to opt out of a class (as opposed 
to objecting to a settlement, which is costly), focusing on the ease of 
opting out is myopic. If the class member does not intend to pursue her 
individual cause of action separately, she is better off not opting out of 
the class at all. It is far better to receive inadequate compensation than to 
receive no compensation at all. Opting out can only function as a check 
on the appropriateness of settlements if opting-out class members 
subsequently file their own suit.127 And filing a class member’s individual 
 
the objector. The three parties will argue that the objection has been addressed and justifies remuneration. 
The previous issues with court supervision will resurface, and it will still be possible to “make a living 
simply by filing frivolous appeals.” Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3. 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). For an analysis of the necessity of notice to class members for this 
purpose, as well as the shift from an opt-in rule to an opt-out rule in 1996 see Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 614-15, 628-29 (1997). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); 
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). 
 125. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 94, at 1538. For a report on such a provision in the recent multi-
billion credit-card settlement recent case see Jennifer Surane, Visa, Mastercard Face Next Fight After $6.2 
Billion Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
18/visa-mastercard-reach-6-2-billion-settlement-over-swipe-fees. 
 126. For this argument in the specific context of opt-outs, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of 
Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard , 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL 
REFORM 581, 586. 
 127. Settlement in Blockbuster class-action suit approved, THE VICTORIA ADVOC., Jan. 13, 2002, 
at C1 (noting that 500 approximately customers had opted out of the settlement and could bring their own 
suit, but that this was impractical given the small amounts to which individual customers were entitled). 
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suit is, of course, even more costly than filing an objection. Not 
surprisingly, empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that the 
number of opt outs is in the vicinity of one to two percent—possibly even 
less.128 When opting out occurs, it is often for strategic reasons. Larger 
class members, for example institutional investors in securities class 
actions, can often extract greater compensation from the defendant129 not 
because they have a better case than other class members,130 but because 
they can make a more credible threat to pursue the case or because the 
defendant is worried about its ongoing relationship with these important 
customers. Although this would seem to increase the total amount paid 
out to the class, it in fact allows the defendant to reduce the total 
payment.131 The original class is left with no member that has any 
significant interest in the outcome.132 The dispersed class members 
subsidize the larger payments made to those large consumers who can 
credibly threaten the defendant with litigation, or with whom the 
defendant wants to maintain an amicable relationship. 
Finally, not all class actions can be opted out of. There are three types 
of class actions from which members cannot opt out: class actions seeking 
injunctive or declaratory relief;133 class actions that are certified because 
separate trials would create the risk of inconsistent adjudication;134 and 
“limited fund” class actions, which may be allowed because if tried 
separately the lawsuits might be “dispositive of the interests of the other 
members . . . or would substantially impair or impede their ability to 
 
 128. Jay Tidmarsh & David Betson, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible" 
Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 544 (2011); Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study Of Class 
Actions In Four Federal District Courts: Final Report To The Advisory Committee On Civil Rules, FED. 
JUD. CTR. 1, 21 (1996); Jay Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies, FED. JUD. 
CTR.1, 10-11 (1998). 
 129. Tidmarsh & Betson, id, at 544; Tidmarsh, id., at 39; Reed R. Kathrein, Opt-Outs, MFNs and 
Game Theory: Can the High Multiples Achieved by Opt-Outs in Recent Mega-Fraud Settlements 
Continue, A Discussion Draft, in SEC. LITIG. & ENFORCEMENT INST. 583,587 – 590 (PLI Corp. L. & 
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1620, 2007); Kessler, Topaz, Meltzer, Check LLP, Opt-Out 
Lawsuits Advantages and Considerations, (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.ktmc.com/blog/opt-out-lawsuit-
advantages-and-considerations; Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller, & Shah, LLP,  Opt-Out Litigation, 
https://www.sfmslaw.com/securities-regulation-corporate-governance/opt-out-litigations/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2020). 
 130. Which would have raised a conflict of interest between class members in the first place. See 
Miller, supra note 126, at 586. 
 131. See Surane, supra note 125. 
 132. On the importance of institutional investors specifically, and larger class members generally, 
see supra the discussion in notes 22 & 47. The larger consumers are important class members, because 
their larger stakes make monitoring of class counsel more likely. But their ability (and propensity) to 
‘abandon ship’ is the negative side of the same observation. 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). See also Bratcher v. Nat’l Standard Life Ins. Co. (In re Monumental 
Life Ins. Co.), 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). See also Corley v. Entergy Corp., 222 F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
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protect their interests.”135 For these types of class actions, the possibility 
of opting out is not even a hypothetical safeguard.136 
5. The Inadequacy Of Existing Mechanisms–Summary 
Ultimately, none of the existing mechanisms provides a safeguard 
against inadequate class settlements. The two mechanisms that rely on 
court supervision are ineffective mainly due to the court’s inability to act 
as an adversary to the parties before it. And the two mechanisms that rely 
on class members taking action are ineffective mainly due to class 
members’ lack of individual incentive to take any action at all. The 
findings according to which “too many cases are settled with illusory 
benefits to class members and large fees for lawyers”,137 and the 
numerous examples of such cases,138 should come as no surprise. 
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD–AUCTIONING APPOINTMENT AS CLASS 
COUNSEL 
This Article proposes a post-settlement auction of the appointment as 
class counsel, a mechanism which spontaneously guarantees the 
adequacy of settlements.  
A. The Basic Mechanism 
Once a settlement has been reached, the right to step in as class counsel 
is auctioned. The minimum bid is the amount the defendant is to pay 
original class counsel in accordance with the settlement. The highest 
bidder pays original class counsel the amount bid and is appointed as class 
counsel. Newly-appointed counsel may then pursue the case as it deems 
fit. She may adjudicate the case, renegotiate a settlement with the 
defendant, or combine the two by continuing to litigate the case and 
settling with the defendant at a later stage. 
There is only one limitation on new class counsel’s fees: the ratio 
between class recovery and class counsel’s fees remains as it was in the 
original settlement. New class counsel’s only way to receive more than 
she paid original class counsel is to increase the class’s recovery. 
 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999). See 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4). 
 136. This last qualification may not be as significant as it might seem on first blush, because these 
types of class actions are far less frequent than “classic” class actions governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
But nonetheless, this is another limitation on the efficacy of opt-outs as a mechanism for assuring the 
adequacy of settlements. 
 137. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at 2. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 24 – 32. 
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Theoretically, the process of ex post auctioning of appointment as class 
counsel may be repeated indefinitely. If new class counsel reaches a 
second settlement with the defendant, the process is repeated until a 
settlement is reached after which no bids are received for appointment as 
class counsel. As this Section will illustrate, because the right to act as 
class counsel is auctioned, there should normally be no need for more than 
a single auction. But as a purely theoretical matter, the process may be 
repeated. 
Importantly, the court need not devote any resources to the excruciating 
and ineffective attempt to assess the adequacy of the settlement. It also 
need not review of the appropriateness of class counsel’s fees. Neither of 
these needs to be looked into by the court. The court need not review them 
when the settlement is first presented. And it need not review them at any 
subsequent stage, including the final stage, when the court sanctions the 
final settlement. The court simply relies on the market to spontaneously 
correct any inadequacy, and sanctions the last settlement presented to it, 
when no one else is willing to bid for appointment as class counsel. 
This method provides the optimal result regardless of the reason for the 
settlement’s inadequacy. Whether class counsel has intentionally received 
a (legal) kickback in return for selling out the class, or unintentionally 
negotiated a bad deal for the class, the market will self-correct. 
To demonstrate this, assume—as in the numeric example presented in 
the Introduction of this Article—that a settlement is reached according to 
which class members receive $100, and class counsel is paid ten dollars 
in fees. 
We may begin with the possibility that class counsel has 
unintentionally negotiated a suboptimal deal. Class counsel does not 
realize that the defendant is actually willing to pay the class $300. The 
defendant may be willing to pay $300 because the case’s legal foundation 
is stronger than class counsel realizes, because the evidence contains a 
“smoking gun” that class counsel has not noticed, or simply because the 
defendant is concerned with the costs of litigation and the reputational 
costs associated with such litigation, such as negative press coverage. Any 
attorney identifying this inadequacy would be willing to bid for the right 
to receive the difference in fees. Original class counsel has done all the 
work and new class counsel simply pays ten dollars to immediately 
approach the defendant with an offer to settle for $300, and receive thirty 
dollars in fees. Potential class counsel would be willing to pay anything 
up to thirty dollars for the right to step in as class counsel. Original class 
counsel is no worse off than she was under the original settlement if she 
is paid exactly ten dollars, or better off if she is paid anything more than 
ten dollars. The transaction is Pareto efficient from the perspective of both 
original class counsel and new class counsel. Importantly, class members 
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will ultimately receive $300 instead of $100. 
Now suppose that, although newly appointed class counsel is a better 
negotiator than original class counsel, he is not the best negotiator on the 
plaintiffs’ bar. After purchasing the right to act as class counsel for ten 
dollars, he quickly settles the case for $150, receiving a fee of fifteen 
dollars. A more vigilant negotiator can then be expected to step in, pay 
second class counsel fifteen dollars, and negotiate a better deal for the 
class and for herself. 
In reality, the auction process will likely not need to be repeated. This 
is because the right to act as class counsel is auctioned and any law firm 
or individual lawyer can participate in the auction and bid. Competition 
amongst law firms to purchase the right to act as class counsel should thus 
drive up the bid in the first round of the auction. The price paid for the 
right to act as class counsel in the first auction should be equal to (or 
marginally lower than) the fee that can be expected when the best possible 
settlement is negotiated. In the previous example, law firms can be 
expected to bid up to thirty dollars for the right to act as class counsel, 
and then negotiate the $300 settlement with the defendant. Once the 
second settlement is reached, there should be no one willing to bid for 
appointment as class counsel. But at least in theory, cases may exist in 
which only one potential bidder realizes the true value of acting as class 
counsel and the price paid to original class counsel is only marginally 
higher than (or equal to) what the defendant would have paid original 
class counsel. Even if this is the case, future auctions can be expected to 
rectify any inappropriateness.  
For example, suppose that, in the same setting of the previous numeric 
example, only one law firm notices a smoking gun in the evidence. It 
realizes that the value of acting as class counsel is thirty dollars, but it 
only bids ten dollars because it does not expect competition for the right 
to act as class counsel. If this first bidder (new class counsel) is 
subsequently willing to take measures to extract the full settlement-
potential ($300), the class’s recovery will be optimal. The class will have 
received the full obtainable amount of $300, original class counsel (who 
missed the smoking gun) will have been paid ten dollars, and the second 
class counsel will have been paid thirty dollars, for a profit of $20. If, 
however, the first bidder (second class counsel) is unwilling or unable to 
incur the hardships of an additional round of negotiations with the 
defendant, it can then reveal the inadequacy of the settlement and 
reauction the right to act as class counsel, which could this time be 
expected to be sold for thirty dollars, as its true value has become known 
to all. Once the right to act as class counsel has been purchased, the first 
bidder has little reason not to reveal the inadequacy of the settlement. It 
wants to resell the asset that is now in its possession—the right to act as 
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class counsel—and has everything to gain and nothing to lose from 
potential bidders realizing the true value of this asset. Therefore, even if 
the first round of the auction does not yield the best-attainable result, 
subsequent rounds will. But in reality, the first auction should yield the 
optimal result. 
This method provides even more comfort in cases of an intentional 
sellout—the case in which class counsel realizes that the settlement is 
suboptimal from the class’s perspective, but is “bribed” by the defendant 
to agree to it. If original class counsel receives a “bribe”, the method 
essentially guarantees the same “bribe” (measured as a percentage of the 
class’s total recovery) to all future class counsel as well. Assume, as in 
the previous example, that the best obtainable settlement is $300 and that 
the fair fee for class counsel is ten percent of the class’s recovery. 
However, defendant and class counsel agree to a $200 settlement for the 
class, and fifty dollars as class counsel’s fees. The immediate implication 
is that class counsel’s fees are fixed at twenty-five percent of the class’s 
recovery, whatever that recovery may ultimately be. The value of acting 
as class counsel instantly becomes seventy-five dollars: twenty-five 
percent of the true value of the claim–$300. The larger the “bribe”, or the 
more egregious the sellout, the more lucrative it becomes to purchase the 
right to act as class counsel. 
The more conspicuous the sellout, the more likely it is that other law 
firms will notice the inadequacy of the settlement. The settling parties 
cannot manipulate this. If class counsel’s fees are set too low, original 
class counsel will not agree to the settlement. It will prefer to insist on a 
better one or pursue the case. If fees are set too high, they become a call 
for others to purchase the right to act as class counsel. As long as there 
are no undisclosed side payments, which would be illegal (and would 
require both parties to submit falsified statements),139 the mechanism 
cannot be manipulated. 
There is, of course, no reason to force new class counsel to settle the 
case immediately after purchasing the right to act as class counsel. To be 
sure, normally a new settlement can be expected to be reached shortly 
after the right to act as class counsel has been purchased. New class 
counsel will have presumably identified the inadequacy of the original 
settlement, suggesting that the current value of the claim exceeds the 
amount agreed to by the defendant. Otherwise, new class counsel would 
not have purchased the right to act as class counsel. This, in turn, implies 
that the defendant can be quickly persuaded to settle for a larger amount. 
Even if the reason for the inadequacy of the settlement is one that may 
only come into play at a later stage in litigation—for example, a “smoking 
 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
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gun” missed by both original class counsel and the defendant—new class 
counsel can reveal this to the defendant immediately after purchasing the 
right to act as class counsel and update the defendant’s assessment of the 
outcome of the case. Thereafter, class counsel can quickly negotiate a 
better deal for the class.140 Therefore, it is likely that settled class actions 
will resettle shortly after the right to act as class counsel has been 
purchased. 
But if, for whatever reason, new class counsel finds it profitable to 
adjudicate the case, there is no reason to prohibit her from doing so. 
Original class counsel will have already been paid for her efforts up to the 
settlement. The amount paid will be at least the amount original class 
counsel agreed to receive within the framework of the settlement, so there 
is no concern that this payment is inadequate compensation for these 
efforts. New class counsel will have internalized these costs because it 
will have paid original class counsel this amount. And the class is well 
protected because new class counsel can only make a profit if the class’s 
recovery is increased. 
To be sure, if new class counsel ultimately loses the case, the class will 
have lost. But this is not unique to settlements or to the proposed 
mechanism. Class members are always exposed to the risk of class 
counsel losing the case. And under the proposed method, class counsel 
has more skin in the game than it usually does. Normally, if the case is 
lost, class counsel loses the time spent on the case. By contrast, under the 
proposed mechanism, class counsel will have lost not only the time spent 
on the case, but also the payment made to original class counsel. Class 
counsel is incentivized to carefully assess the merits of the case and 
professionally adjudicate it to a far greater extent than class counsel 
normally is. 
B. The Ex Ante Effect of the Method–Securing the Adequacy of the First 
Settlement 
 This Article has thus far focused on the expected response of law 
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar to inadequate settlements. But of course the 
threat of the ex post auction should work back to the original (first) 
settlement and guarantee its adequacy. 
If a defendant “bribes” class counsel in the first settlement, the low-
ball settlement (from class members’ perspective) is sure to attract 
bidders, as purchasing the right to act as class counsel becomes a lucrative 
investment opportunity. Ultimately, the settlement will be more costly for 
 
 140. This is a straightforward extension of the shadow-of-trial model. See Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
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the defendant than a fair original settlement would have been. It will 
ultimately pay the class the fair value of the settlement and pay fees that 
are greater than it would have otherwise paid. Defendant thus has an 
incentive to reach a fair first settlement, in which class counsel’s fees are 
not excessive. At the same time, class counsel has little reason to agree to 
a suboptimal settlement. Therefore, class counsel can be expected to 
negotiate the best attainable settlement in order to extract the largest fees 
possible. This method should normally result in the first settlement being 
the best possible one. 
In any event, courts never need to review the terms of class settlements. 
Whether the first settlement is the best attainable one and no firm is 
willing to bid for appointment as class counsel or some subsequent 
settlement is the best attainable one, the court applies a simple process 
that never requires any substantive review: it continues to auction the right 
to act as class counsel every time a new settlement is reached, awarding 
this right to the highest bidder. Once there are no bids for appointment as 
class counsel, it sanctions the most recent settlement.  
C. Eliminating The ‘Reverse Auction’ Problem 
The method proposed in this Article also solves the “reverse auction” 
problem. The reverse auction is a result of competition between different 
attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar to be appointed as class counsel. At times, 
different attorneys will file certification motions in different courts 
against the same defendant or defendants, alleging similar causes of 
action on behalf of identical or similar classes. This is extremely common 
when class actions are filed in the wake a scandal.141 This results in 
competition between counsel for appointment as class counsel. In such 
settings, the Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to appoint the 
applicant “best able to represent the interests of the class”.142 Much of 
courts’ resources at the earlier stages of class actions are devoted to 
resolving this rivalry, and the courts are forced to consider numerous 
intangible factors such as experience, willingness and ability to commit 
to time-consuming litigation, willingness to cooperate with other counsel, 
access to resources to litigate in a timely manner, and any other relevant 
factors.143 Different courts use different methods. At times, courts appoint 
different lead counsels for each putative class. Sometimes, multiple firms 
 
 141. Pretrial Order No. 2: Application for Appointment of Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel and Steering 
Committee Members, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (MDL No. 2672). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(a)(i) – (iv), (g)(1)(b). 
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are appointed as class counsel and steering committees are established.144 
Often, the need arises to appoint interim class counsel until courts render 
a final decision on the appointment of class counsel.145 
This process is demanding and requires coordination between the 
various courts in which the certification motions are filed. This 
coordination problem can be abused by both class counsel and the 
defendant. One of the ways in which a firm competing with others can 
secure its appointment as class counsel is by reaching a settlement with 
the defendant and having the agreement sanctioned by the relevant court. 
A reverse auction occurs when the defendant uses competition among 
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar to obtain a low-ball settlement. As the court in 
Reynolds observed:  
[T]he defendant in a series of class actions picks the most ineffectual class 
lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that the district court will 
approve a weak settlement that will preclude other claims against the 
defendant.146 
The ex post auction mechanism rectifies the reverse auction problem.147 
If the reverse auction pushes the price of the first settlement down, the 
subsequent auctions will drive it back up. The simple mechanism this 
Article proposes guarantees that the best possible settlement from the 
class’s perspective will ultimately be negotiated. The terms of the first 
settlement become a moot issue. 
D. Applicability of The Method To Coupon Settlements 
The application of the method to coupon settlements, in which class 
members receive coupons for future purchases from the defendant, is not 
immediately apparent. Nonetheless, the mechanism is very easily applied 
to coupon settlements as well. 
Before proceeding to explain how the method can be applied to coupon 
settlements, it is important to note that coupon settlements are a valuable 
tool. Although coupon settlements may be abused, as demonstrated in the 
preceding Sections, they can also significantly increase the value class 
members receive in a settlement. If the cost of a coupon to the defendant 
is lower than the value of the coupon to class members, paying class 
members in the form of coupons will allow class members to receive 
greater value than they would have received in a cash settlement.148 
 
 144. BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 66, at 31 – 35. 
 145. Id. at 33. 
 146. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 147. For the significant resources devoted to such scrutiny see Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 
517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 148. This will be the case even the coupon redemption-rate is 100%; that is, all class members 
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Settings in which the value of the coupon to class members exceeds the 
cost of the coupon to the defendant seem to be relatively common. 
Whenever the defendant produces the product or provides the service for 
which the coupons can be used, the cost to the defendant of the coupons 
is smaller than their value to purchasers (or class members). If coupons 
have additional benefits from the defendant’s perspective, for example 
because they serve as a promotion for the defendant’s products,149 the 
defendant may again be willing to pay a larger amount in coupons than it 
is willing to pay in cash. 
Generally, coupon settlements may be a way to increase class 
members’ total benefits from the settlement. The real issue with coupon 
settlements is not that coupons are inherently under-compensatory, but 
that their redemption rate may be too low. Calculating the value of the 
settlement by multiplying the number of class members by the coupons’ 
face value may largely overstate the real value of the settlement to the 
class. Class counsel and the defendant may intentionally set the face value 
of the coupon to be small enough to ensure that redemption rates remain 
low. This manipulation allows class counsel and the defendant to abuse 
coupon settlements. 
To address this, the proposed mechanism can simply be applied based 
on the face value of a single coupon, rather than on the purported class 
recovery. The ratio fixed by the first settlement would not be the ratio of 
class counsel’s fees to total class recovery. Rather, it would be the ratio 
of class counsel’s fees to the face value of the coupons. If the face value 
of the coupons has been set too low, the defendant will be willing to 
increase the face value of the coupons because the true value of the 
settlement to the defendant is much higher. If this happens, new class 
counsel can significantly increase its own fees. 
Consider the extreme example of the ITT Financial Corporation 
settlement.150 In the framework of the settlement, class members were 
awarded coupons. Only two of the 96,754 coupons—or 0.002 percent—
were redeemed. Class counsel’s fees were calculated based on the value 
of nearly 100,000 coupons.151 The defendant would clearly have been 
willing to increase the face value of the coupons by orders of magnitude. 
Increasing the face value of the coupons would have had a double effect. 
First, it would have increased the amount recovered by those class 
members who redeemed their coupons. Second, it would have 
 
redeem all of the coupons. 
 149. As some have argued was the case in the ITT case, subsequently discussed. See Hantler & 
Norton, supra note 25, at 3 (citing Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action Suit: “Winning” $2.19 Costs 
$91.33, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995). See also Rhode, supra note 24, at 465. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra note 27. 
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presumably increased redemption rates. But even if the face-value of the 
coupons were increased tenfold, it is hard to believe that this would have 
made the settlement cost-prohibitive from the defendant’s perspective. 
And new class counsel would have received ten times what original class 
counsel received. Similarly, in the Blockbuster settlement, in which class 
members received a coupon for a one-dollar discount on rentals,152 even 
if the defendant could only have been persuaded to increase the face-value 
of the coupons to $1.25, new class counsel could have earned nearly $2.5 
million—(twenty-five percent of original class counsel’s fees. Clearly, 
this would have been incentive enough to renegotiate a deal that was 
unattractive to class members. 
Precisely assessing the effect of an increase in coupon face-value may 
be slightly more complicated than assessing the effect of an increase in 
the amount of cash settlements because it requires considering two 
elements rather than one. Potential bidders for appointment as class 
counsel must consider both the increased per-class-member payment and 
the effect on redemption rates. But this is done anyway. All parties to a 
settlement obviously engage in estimating these effects as it is. 
Defendants necessarily engage in such an estimate because it affects their 
total exposure. And class counsel necessarily engages in such an estimate, 
because even under the current regime, higher face-value means greater 
fees.153 Parties obviously assess the true costs and benefits of coupon 
settlements under the current regime as well, and would-be bidders have 
a strong incentive to identify inadequate settlements. 
In fact, if coupon settlements are indeed abused, the proposed 
mechanism will likely be a very effective tool in securing their adequacy. 
As explained in the context of cash settlements,154 the more extreme the 
level of under-compensation, the higher the profitability of being 
appointed as class counsel. If coupon settlements allow parties to conceal 
the settlements’ inadequacies from the court, potential bidders have an 
offsetting incentive to discover and reveal such inadequacies. If the truly 
extreme sellouts occur in coupon settlements, it should be easy enough 
for attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar to identify gross inadequacies. 
Returning to the ITT Financial Corporation settlement, it seems nearly 
certain that ITT could have easily been persuaded to increase the face 
value of the coupons tenfold. Given the redemption-rate of less than 
0.002%, this seems like an extremely moderate assumption. And this 
would have meant a 900% return on the investment of any attorney who 
identified the inadequacy. This seems to be a very strong incentive to get 
 
 152. See supra note 31. 
 153. Because this allows the parties to present the settlement as providing class members with larger 
recovery – see supra notes 93 – 94. 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 33 – 34. 
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involved in the case. 
Finally, the costs of a mistaken assessment are unlikely to be extreme 
from new class counsel’s perspective. Even if, for whatever reason, new 
class counsel miscalculates the defendant’s willingness when bidding, 
and ultimately finds that it cannot negotiate a higher coupon-face-value, 
its loss can easily be cut. When new class counsel realizes that it cannot 
negotiate a better settlement, it can quickly resort to the terms of the 
original settlement. New class counsel will have paid original class 
counsel’s fees but received the same fees from the defendant. It will have 
lost nothing in terms of out-of-pocket funds. To be sure, it will have lost 
the time invested in negotiating a better settlement. But this hardly seems 
like an extreme cost and will only be borne if class counsel somehow 
miscalculated the best attainable settlement. Law firms of the plaintiffs’ 
bar may also develop a practice of obtaining portfolios of coupon 
settlements in which they attempt to renegotiate. Given the relatively low 
costs of the unprofitable cases (time spent before resorting to the original 
settlement), it is likely that improving settlement terms in some of the 
firm’s portfolio will make the whole endeavor profitable. 
Ultimately, the method is applicable to coupon settlements as well. It 
may, in fact, be even more powerful in this setting if indeed coupon 
settlements often conceal grave mistreatments of the class. 
E. Limitations 
The method proposed in this Article has two limitations that must be 
acknowledged. 
1. Coupon Settlements Followed By Cash Settlements 
The first limitation of this Article’s proposed method is that it cannot 
automatically rectify settings in which there is a “change of currency” 
between the first and second settlements. Specifically, if the first 
settlement is a coupon settlement and the second settlement is a cash 
settlement, the conversion rate of coupon to cash cannot be set 
automatically. 
Consider a coupon settlement, according to which 100 class members 
are to receive 100 one-dollar coupons. The settling parties also agree that 
class counsel will be paid ten dollars in fees. A law firm of the plaintiffs’ 
bar realizes that only a small percentage of the coupons, say five percent, 
will be redeemed, given their trivial value. The firm purchases the right 
to act as class counsel for ten dollars–the fee negotiated by original class 
counsel. It then settles the case for a forty-dollar cash payment to class 
members. New class counsel’s fees cannot be set based on the ratio set in 
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the original settlement. 
This limitation is not significant. First, there is no reason to think that 
such an odd setting is very realistic. Why would the second settlement be 
a cash settlement if the first settlement was a coupon settlement? Nothing 
prevents second class counsel from reaching a better coupon settlement. 
Keeping the “currency” of the settlement as “coupon currency” will allow 
new class counsel to improve the settlement from the class’s perspective 
and increase its own payment. In the previous example, if the defendant 
is willing to settle for forty dollars in cash, and if indeed class members 
would have only redeemed five dollars in coupons under the original 
settlement, the defendant will presumably be willing to increase the face 
value of the coupons. This will allow new class counsel to receive a quick 
return on its investment, while at the same time improving class recovery. 
And as previously discussed, coupon settlements are not objectionable per 
se. When the face value of the coupons is appropriate, they add value to 
the class. New class counsel is fully motivated to reach a second coupon 
settlement, and at the end of the day class members should be no worse 
off than they would have been under a cash settlement. 
Moreover, not all potential bidders must be able to reach a better 
coupon settlement for the method to provide spontaneous supervision of 
the adequacy of the coupon settlement. As long as there are any attorneys 
on the plaintiffs’ bar that can reach a better coupon settlement (i.e., higher 
coupon face value), the method will work perfectly. These attorneys will 
bid for appointment as class counsel and will ultimately achieve the 
optimal settlement from the class’s perspective. And of course, the 
possibility of such bidders will work back to the original settlement and 
secure its adequacy. Thus, the only settlements that pose an issue are those 
where no attorney believes it can improve as a coupon settlement. And if 
no attorney can improve the settlement as a coupon settlement, the 
settlement is probably not grossly inadequate. 
For this limitation to be meaningful in any way, two extremely unlikely 
conditions must be met. First, all potential bidders of the plaintiffs’ bar 
must believe that they cannot improve the settlement in any way as a 
coupon settlement. Second, although none can improve the settlement as 
a coupon settlement, some must believe that they can improve the 
settlement as a cash settlement, otherwise the settlement is by definition 
the best attainable settlement.  
Therefore, this limitation does not seem of any practical significance. 
But, indeed, if these two conditions are ever met, the method will not 
guarantee perfect and spontaneous supervision. 
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2. Smaller Class Recovery and (Much) Smaller Fees for Class Counsel 
Another limitation of the method is that it fails to incentivize a specific 
type of attorney to bid for appointment as class counsel. Specifically, the 
method will not attract bids from an attorney who can only obtain a 
smaller overall settlement (because, for example, she is slightly less 
competent), but is nonetheless willing to accept a smaller fee, leaving 
class members with a larger net recovery. 
Consider the following scenario. First class counsel settles the case for 
$100, of which ten dollars are paid as fees, and class members’ net 
recovery is ninety dollars. Any attorney who can obtain more than a total 
of $100 will be incentivized to bid for appointment as class counsel. 
However, there may also be attorneys who can only achieve a total 
recovery of ninety-five dollars, but are nonetheless satisfied with only 
four dollars as fees. If such an attorney is appointed, class members will 
be left with a larger net recovery of ninety-one dollars instead of ninety 
dollars. But such an attorney will not find it worthwhile to bid for 
appointment as class counsel because she can only make a profit if she 
increases the class’s total recovery.155 
This limitation is also not troubling. First, while such a settlement may 
leave class members with a larger net compensation, it is not necessarily 
more socially desirable. This is because such a settlement achieves more 
by way of corrective justice for class members, but less in terms of 
deterrence. The defendant ultimately pays less under such a settlement 
than under the original settlement (ninety-five dollars instead of $100), 
which results in under-deterrence.156 This must be the case, because if the 
defendant was to ultimately pay more under the second settlement, second 
class attorney would have found it lucrative to bid for appointment as 
class counsel. Therefore, only subsequent settlements which sacrifice 
deterrence will not be incentivized by the method. 
Second, while this method cannot indeed incentivize the less-able-
more-generous attorney, it will incentivize all more-able-equally-
generous attorneys. And in this sense, it guarantees profitability for an 
extremely large number of firms of the plaintiffs’ bar. As long as there 
are attorneys capable of achieving more for class members, sellouts and 
genuine mistakes will indeed be rectified. 
 
 155. I thank Ehud Guttel for pressing me on this point. 
 156. For a review of the various goals of tort law (focusing specifically on deterrence and corrective 
justice) see Ariel Porat, The Many Faces Of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 105 (2003). 
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III. A THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVE – FULL PURCHASE OF THE CLASS’S 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
A theoretical alternative to the method developed in this Article is the 
auctioning of the class’s right of action itself. Rather than bidding for the 
right to act as class counsel, the class’s entire cause of action may be 
auctioned for the full amount agreed to by the defendant (i.e., the sum of 
the class’s recovery and class counsel’s fees). The new purchaser would 
then pay class members the amount they were to be paid in accordance 
with the terms of the settlement. The purchaser would also pay original 
class counsel its fees, as agreed in the settlement. Having internalized the 
full costs of the case up to that point, the purchaser could then be allowed 
to proceed and handle the action as it deemed fit, with no additional 
limitation. It could retain original class counsel to act on its behalf, hire 
different counsel, settle, or adjudicate.157 There would be no need to place 
any additional limitations. 
The full-purchase alternative is nonetheless problematic in two 
important respects. First, the full-purchase option addresses only one of 
the two goals of class actions. Class actions aim not only to deter 
wrongdoers, but also to compensate victims. The full-purchase option 
may achieve deterrence, but not compensation.158 
Defendants will indeed be perfectly deterred, as they will ultimately be 
held accountable for the full sum they should be held accountable for. If 
original class counsel settles for too little, a purchaser will buy the case 
and pursue it. The defendant will ultimately pay the full amount of the 
claim if the case is adjudicated or purchase a release for its true value, 
given the risks and costs associated with the lawsuit, if a second 
settlement is reached. 
But this will not improve class members’ situation in any way. Class 
members will still only be paid the original-settlement amount. In the 
scenario described here, this amount is under-compensatory by 
definition.159 The purchaser will pocket the full difference between the 
 
 157. A similar idea has been suggested to combat closely related (although not identical) concerns 
in Parens Patria settlements. Briefly, these are cases in which State Attorneys General hire private 
attorneys to pursue actions on their behalf. Although the problems in both settings are not identical, they 
are closely related. Beach has suggested a post-settlement auction of the full settlement amount in these 
cases. See Beach, supra note 5, at 492 – 505. 
 158. The full-purchase option functions as a Pigouvian tax. It may achieve optimal deterrence (or 
optimal output levels in tax-law jargon). But absent a distributive method allocating the tax collected (or 
the payment made by the defendant) to those harmed by the externality, it will not compensate the direct 
victims harmed by the externality. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 
62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972). 
 159. Another closely related problem is class members’ cooperation. Because class members have 
nothing to gain once the lawsuit has been purchased, they will likely be less willing to cooperate with the 
new purchaser. Rather than willingly appearing, witnesses may need to be subpoenaed; documents and 
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value of the first settlement and the value of the second settlement or final 
ruling. 
By contrast, the auction of the right to act as counsel for the class 
achieves both goals. Class members also share in the final outcome of the 
case. In fact, the lion’s share of the additional amount ultimately paid will 
accrue to class members because class counsel’s fees are only a fraction 
of the total value of the settlement.160 
A second problem with the purchase of the class’s cause of action is 
that it requires paying an amount much greater than the amount required 
when auctioning the right to act as class counsel. The full amount of a 
settlement is, naturally, larger than class counsel’s fees by orders of 
magnitude.161 Economic agents capable of providing such funds are 
scarce. When settlement amounts are large, as they often are, only a 
handful of agents are likely to be able to purchase the whole class’s right 
of action. This makes this solution less practical. Moreover, as potential 
funders of such purchases are rare, they will naturally possess market 
power, which will in turn lead them to require a supra-competitive return 
on their investment. Inadequacies that are not extreme do not provide such 
a potential return and will not be worth the investment for funders that 
possess market power. 
By contrast, this Article’s proposed method allows the purchasing 
entity to pay a fraction of the total value of the settlement. Any law firm 
capable of handling the case on behalf of the class can participate in the 
 
other pieces of evidence that are accessible to class members may not be provided to the new purchaser; 
and so on. This shortcoming of the full-purchase option is probably not an extremely important one in all 
class actions, because class members’ incentive to cooperate with the lawsuit is practically non-existent 
in most cases anyway. Individual class members regularly stand to gain very little from the lawsuit, and 
the cost of cooperation normally far exceeds any potential (private) advantage of such cooperation. 
Nonetheless, at times individual class members who stand to receive more from the class action (for 
example, because they are larger purchasers who have purchased a large number of units from the 
defendant) may be more willing to cooperate when they stand to increase their individual compensation. 
These larger class members will regularly have more helpful evidence to provide than other class 
members, and so on. This willingness is lost under the full-purchase option. See also supra notes 22, 47 
& 132. 
 160. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, find that attorney’s fees are approximately 25% of the class’s 
recovery (at 947 – 948). Class members will thus normally receive 75% of the additional payment. It is 
unclear whether Eisenberg et al. measure the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery 
or class counsel’s fees and the total payment (in cases in which class counsel’s fees are not paid directly 
out of the class’s recovery). If the latter is the case, class members will accrue 80% of the total payment. 
 161. As a general rule of thumb, bidders will only have to pay a quarter of the total value of the 
settlement (or a fifth, see id.). But even this might be an exaggeration. First, as explained, at present there 
is reason to believe that attorney’s fees are excessive. Once a mechanism is put in place disincentivizing 
the payment of excessive fees, the ratio of attorney’s fees to class recovery can be expected to decrease. 
Additionally, it should be noted that Eisenberg et al. find a scaling effect, whereby the larger the class’s 
recovery, the smaller the percentage of attorney’s fees (Figure 5). The larger the case, the smaller the 
percentage of attorney’s fees. Where funding of the settlement is most costly, the payment required under 
the method suggested in this Article will comprise an even smaller fraction of the settlement amount. 
42
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/3
386 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
auction. This, in turn, guarantees that terms of class settlements will be 
closely monitored by a large number of law firms competing amongst 
themselves to identify inadequate class settlements. In a recent survey of 
class actions between 2009 and 2013, Eisenberg et al. found that for 
ninety-two percent of class actions (those in which total recovery was 
$100 million or less), the mean fee was approximately $2.5 million, 
whereas the mean recovery was slightly greater than $10 million.162 In all 
of these cases, a single law firm (or a very small number of law firms 
joining forces) should be able to participate in the auction. The outliers 
were very large cases in which the award was $100 million or more. In 
such cases, certainly in the few in which total class recovery exceeded 
$500 million (1.5% of the cases),163 even the cost of class counsel’s fees 
may have been too costly for any single firm, or even for a small number 
of firms.  
In such cases, a larger number of law firms can form an ad hoc 
consortium. Several consortia of law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar may be 
formed to compete amongst themselves to purchase the right to act as 
class counsel. There would still be a very large number of such consortia 
that would compete to purchase the appointment. The number of 
economic agents reviewing the adequacy of settlements is thus multiplied 
by thousands, if not more. Numerous law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar can 
be expected to closely follow the terms of class settlements. And given 
competition between them, they would also be willing to invest even for 
a smaller rate of return, implying that even relatively minor inadequacies 
will be rectified. The tolerable-inadequacy range will be much smaller 
under the method proposed in this Article. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the most perplexing issues of mass litigation is the inadequacy 
of class settlements. Class settlements are a unique setting, in which class 
counsel’s interests are aligned with the defendant’s interests, and in direct 
opposition to class members’ interests. Class counsel and the defendant 
both have an interest in increasing class counsel’s fees in return for a 
reduction in the amount payable to class members. Due to class members’ 
rational apathy, class settlements also provide an opportunity for class 
counsel and the defendant to further this joint interest. Similarly, class 
counsel may mistakenly settle for a suboptimal amount. 
Neither intentional sellouts nor genuine mistakes are properly 
addressed by the current supervision mechanisms. Mechanisms that rely 
 
 162. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 943. 
 163. Id. at 944. 
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on court supervision are ineffective due to the court’s institutional 
incompetence and lack of incentive to act as an adversary to the parties 
before it and strike down settlements. Mechanisms that rely on class 
members’ participation fail because class members are, generally, 
rationally apathetic to the whole process. An abundance of research and 
caselaw suggests that class settlements enrich class attorneys but offer 
very little benefits to class members. There are many striking examples 
of extreme cases in which attorneys walked away with hefty fees and class 
members received illusory benefits. Class actions end up harming the very 
individuals they were set up to benefit. Individual class members find 
themselves bound by inappropriate settlements to the benefit of class 
counsel and defendants. 
The method proposed in this Article results in spontaneous correction 
of class-settlement inadequacies. The proposed method would allow any 
attorney or law firm to bid for the right to act as class counsel once a 
settlement has been reached, while fixing the ratio of class counsel’s fees 
to class recovery. The method aligns the various parties’ incentives in a 
socially optimal manner both before and after a settlement is reached. 
Instead of the court, an incompetent and ill-incentivized agent, a 
practically infinite number of attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar will function 
as supervisors of class settlements. This method also relieves the court of 
the time-consuming and ineffective task of reviewing the adequacy of 
class settlements. No such review is ever necessary. The court may simply 
sanction the last settlement without ever reviewing its terms. Public 
expenditure is curbed and the socially optimal outcome is achieved. 
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